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ABSTRACT
This Article investigates the relationship between the decisions by
lawmakers to use municipal and criminal systems to generate reve-
nue and the lack of access to individual defense representation by
using the Ferguson, Missouri, municipal court as a case study. The
Article chronicles the myriad constitutional rights that were violated
on a systemic basis in Ferguson’s municipal court and how those
violations made the city’s reliance on the court for revenue generation
possible. The Article also documents how the introduction of individ-
ual defense representation, even on a piecemeal basis, played a role
in altering Ferguson’s system of governance. Using this case study,
the Article examines the way litigating individual cases and seeking
the enforcement of constitutional rights can alter the cost-benefit of
using courts to generate funds by both increasing system expenses
and decreasing revenues. Further, individual case litigation alters
the cost-benefit of using courts as revenue generators by forcing of-
ficials to take a public position on municipal court practices, thereby
informing and changing the public debate on crime policy. The
Article posits that while individual defense representation will have
the greatest systemic effects in systems like Ferguson’s, where there
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is a significant dependence on the courts for revenue, a pattern of
unconstitutional activity, or the targeting of economically vulnerable
communities, individual defense representation should be broadly
understood as a tool for systemic reform.
The Article also raises theoretical and normative implications
from the Ferguson experience regarding whether constitutional crim-
inal procedural rules or local government controls over procedure
serve as a better check against systemic abuses, and regarding the
repercussions of a politically and doctrinally myopic focus on access
to counsel as a solely constitutional, as opposed to political, matter.
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INTRODUCTION
When tensions in Ferguson, Missouri, exploded in the late sum-
mer of 2014 following the shooting of Michael Brown by Ferguson
police officer Darren Wilson, the ArchCity Defenders sought to
provide some context to the anger and anguish exhibited by the
city’s residents.1 The ArchCity Defenders, a nonprofit legal aid
organization based in St. Louis, Missouri, which at the time focused
on housing and homelessness issues, had been engaged in a court-
watching project. The project arose out of concerns that many of its
clients had arrest warrants—issued as a result of their inability to
pay fines and fees ordered by municipal courts around St. Louis
County—that prevented them from accessing housing, treatment,
and employment services.2 
Just five days after the shooting, the ArchCity Defenders released
a White Paper detailing what it had witnessed in nearly thirty of
the county’s municipal courts.3 The Paper described perfunctory
hearings in which judges neither informed defendants that they
may have a right to counsel nor provided it, assessed economic sanc-
tions without considering a defendant’s ability to pay, and issued
warrants for and ultimately incarcerated—sometimes for weeks at
a time—people who were too poor to pay the sanctions imposed.4
The White Paper suggested what motivated these behaviors: the
1. See Interview with Thomas B. Harvey, Dir., ArchCity Defs. (July 7, 2016) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Harvey Interview]; Erica Smith, Law Professionals Discuss Court Fines,
Fees, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Sept. 30, 2014), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/law-
professionals-discuss-court-fines-fees [https://perma.cc/7JGD-MMGF].
2. See Smith, supra note 1; see also Radley Balko, How Municipalities in St. Louis
County, Mo., Profit from Poverty, WASH. POST: THE WATCH (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/09/03/how-st-louis-county-missouri-profits-from-
poverty/ [https://perma.cc/H5TM-AU4N].
3. See THOMAS HARVEY ET AL., ARCHCITY DEFENDERS: MUNICIPAL COURTS WHITE PAPER
1, 3 (2014) [hereinafter ARCHCITY WHITE PAPER]; see also Stephen Deere, North County
Municipalities Talking About Merger of Courts Before Reforms Are Forced on Them, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/north-
county-municipalities-talking-about-merger-of-courts-before-reforms/article_c0ba92ab-3d39-
5cb0-a8a3-d55eda0269e2.html [https://perma.cc/MN9W-2M3F] (describing the August 14
ArchCity White Paper as “skewering the area’s courts for mistreating poor people and
blocking outsiders from seeing what goes on”).
4. See generally ARCHCITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 3.
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municipalities were using economic sanctions as a revenue-gener-
ating mechanism, producing millions of dollars that were used to
operate municipal governments on the backs of their poorest and
most politically vulnerable citizens.5 The municipalities appeared to
be targeting low-income and black communities with these prac-
tices. For example, fines were collected at rates more than fifteen
times higher in one low-income, majority-black community than in
a more affluent neighboring municipality.6 Ferguson was among the
three worst offenders.7
In the weeks and months to come, Ferguson would, of course,
become a household name.8 The U.S. Department of Justice sent a
team to investigate the Ferguson Police Department, gaining access
to city and municipal court officials, internal emails, and documents
that would shed more light on what the ArchCity Defenders had
uncovered.9 The Department released a Report that, in addition to
addressing the issues of police misconduct that led to Brown’s death,
described in great detail a disturbing abuse of power by judges,
court personnel, prosecutors, police, and municipal authorities
regarding the use of fines and fees to fill municipal coffers.10 The of-
fenses detailed in the Report were often minor: having “High Grass
and Weeds” in one’s yard,11 failing to wear a seatbelt while in a
parked car,12 or—as then-Attorney General Eric Holder highlighted
in his remarks on the Department’s investigation—the “highly-
discretionary offense described as ‘Manner of Walking Along
Roadway.’”13 Many offenses were enforced against the area’s black
5. See id. at 11-13.
6. See id. at 12 (quoting from Ray Downs, ArchCity Defenders: Meet the Legal Super-
heroes Fighting for St. Louis’ Downtrodden, RIVERFRONT TIMES (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.
riverfronttimes.com/stlouis/archcity-defenders-meet-the-legal-superheroes-fighting-for-st-
louis-downtrodden/Content?oid=2505869 [https://perma.cc/VFT9-6NQT]).
7. See id. at 3.
8. See Scott Neuman, Ferguson Timeline: Grief, Anger and Tension, NPR (Nov. 24, 2014),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/11/24/364103735/ferguson-timeline-grief-anger-
and-tension [https://perma.cc/2M2Q-ER9Q].
9. See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE DEPARTMENT 1 (2015) [hereinafter FERGUSON REPORT].
10. See id. at 2-4.
11. Id. at 7.
12. See id. at 3.
13. Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks Providing Update on Investi-
gations in Ferguson, Missouri (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-
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residents almost exclusively.14 Once embroiled in the municipal
court system for these low-level offenses, the repercussions were
anything but minor: intractable debt; the loss of drivers’ licenses,
employment, and housing; and even incarceration.15
The decision by Ferguson officials to use the municipal court
system to generate revenue was a political one. There were other
choices. While the municipality’s ability to raise property taxes is
constrained by state law, its officials could have sought the power
to increase such taxes through a referendum.16 Its officials could
have pursued opportunities to consolidate the municipal court, or
even its entire system, with neighboring municipalities so as to
reach economies of scale on public service expenditures, thereby
reducing the need for revenue.17 They also could have curbed spend-
ing, which in the lead-up to the shooting included “buil[ding] an $8
million fire station, issu[ing] bonds to fund the $3.5 million-dollar
renovation of the police station, and g[iving] all municipal employ-
ees (almost half of whom work for the Police Department) an 8
percent raise.”18 Ferguson officials instead chose to generate
revenues through its municipal court.
general-holder-delivers-update-investigations-ferguson-missouri [https://perma.cc/G3BQ-
QJ2M].
14. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 62-69.
15. See id. at 4.
16. See Walter Johnson, Ferguson’s Fortune 500 Company, ATLANTIC (Apr. 26, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/fergusons-fortune-500-company/390492/
[https://perma.cc/SL2F-6G6B].
17. See, e.g., BETTER TOGETHER, THE WILL TO CHANGE 7-8 (2016), http://www.better
togetherstl.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/BT-Will-to-Change-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
LZB6-F24J] (reporting on a study of ninety independent municipalities in the St. Louis region,
including their reliance on municipal court fees); cf. Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving
Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364, 1422-23 (2012).
18. Johnson, supra note 16.
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Ferguson officials, like municipal officials across the country,19
also declined to provide counsel to people charged in its municipal
court and subjected to the fines and fees upon which the munici-
pality so heavily relied.20 The question of whether Ferguson was
constitutionally mandated to provide counsel is muddy.21 The
United States Supreme Court has declined to extend the right to
counsel to fine-only cases.22 But it has left open the question of
whether the right to counsel at trial extends to circumstances under
which a jurisdiction imposes economic sanctions at sentencing for
which the failure to pay triggers incarceration,23 or to collections
hearings.24 Both practices were at issue in Ferguson.25 Regardless,
even absent a constitutional mandate, Ferguson officials could have
chosen to provide counsel in its courts but did not do so.
In this Article, I chronicle the links between Ferguson’s reliance
on fines and fees for revenue generation and its decision not to
19. See, e.g., Rebecca McCray, This Is What Justice Looks Like in Many Small Towns
Across America, TAKEPART (Aug. 14, 2015), http://www.takepart.com/feature/2015/08/14/
indigent-courts-right-attorney [https://perma.cc/U2FK-RPTJ]. In some jurisdictions, counsel
is provided in limited circumstances in municipal courts as a matter of state constitutional
right. For example, in New Jersey, if a defendant has a pending indictable offense, she has
a right to counsel to challenge the sufficiency of the charge even if the probable cause hearing
occurs in municipal court. See State v. Dennis, 885 A.2d 429, 430 (N.J. 2005) (per curiam). A
state constitutional right to counsel is also recognized in New Jersey when a defendant may
be subject to a sentence with “consequence[s] of magnitude” such as the loss of a driver’s
license or fine of $1800 or more. See Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 277 A.2d 216, 223 (N.J. 1971);
see also Act of June 11, 2016, ch. 366, 2016 Colo. Sess. Laws 1540 (a recently passed Colorado
measure that created a statutory right to counsel in municipal court).
20. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 58, 100 (noting, with little discussion, that
Ferguson did not provide counsel). 
21. Compare Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979), with Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S.
431, 449 (2011), and Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 672-74 (2002).
22. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74; see also infra notes 410-22 and accompanying text.
23. See Shelton, 535 U.S. at 672-74.
24. See Turner, 564 U.S. at 449.
25. The Missouri Supreme Court Rules also provide for a right to counsel if a conviction
“would possibly result in confinement,” MO. SUP. CT. R. 37.50, or if a person is arrested and
placed in confinement due to the alleged commission of an ordinance violation, MO. SUP. CT.
R. 37.13. The wording of the former rule, however, leaves unclear whether the right exists
when the ordinance allows for confinement, as Ferguson’s ordinances do, or instead is only
available if the court is likely to impose incarceration as the initial sentence, see MO. SUP. 
CT. R. 37.50, which rarely happened in Ferguson, see FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 8-9.
Likewise, the latter rule pertaining to the right while confined upon arrest is limited to
circumstances in which the person arrested specifically requests counsel, but includes no
requirement that the court inform the person that the right exists. See MO. SUP. CT. R. 37.13.
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provide counsel to people charged in its municipal court. I argue
that Ferguson’s political system failed its poor and black citizens in
significant part because they were unrepresented by counsel. Had
people subjected to Ferguson’s municipal court scheme been
afforded indigent defense representation, they would have been
better able to challenge violations of numerous procedural and
substantive constitutional rights, making many of the abuses that
occurred illegal and fiscally impossible. Further, individual defense
counsel can create—and as detailed below, has ultimately created
in Ferguson—space for a public conversation about crime policy. In
other words, I contend that legal representation not only helps
protect the rights of individual clients, but also has the potential to
alter systems of governance and therefore should be understood as
a mechanism of systemic reform. Ferguson serves as a case study26
that shows the capacity for indigent defense counsel to change the
cost-benefit of crime policy decisions and to shape public debate, and
to do both through the zealous representation of individual clients
that is central to their role.27
26. The abuses in Ferguson’s municipal court system are similar to practices in
jurisdictions across the country. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE
RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’ PRISONS 6-10 (2010); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF WASH.
& COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVS., MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS: THE WAYS COURT-IMPOSED
DEBTS PUNISH PEOPLE FOR BEING POOR 3 (2014); ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 13-18 (2010); ALEXES HARRIS, A
POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR 52-54 (2016);
LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE S.F. BAY AREA ET AL., NOT JUST A FERGUSON PROB-
LEM: HOW TRAFFIC COURTS DRIVE INEQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA 4, 12 (2015) [hereinafter NOT
JUST A FERGUSON PROBLEM]; RACHEL L. MCLEAN & MICHAEL D. THOMPSON, COUNCIL OF STATE
GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., REPAYING DEBTS 7-8 (2007); Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, the
Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR (May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/
transcript/transcript.php?storyId=312158516 [https://perma.cc/BJ5X-R3PH]; Joseph Shapiro,
Supreme Court Ruling Not Enough to Prevent Debtors Prisons, NPR (May 21, 2014, 5:01 AM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=313118629 [https://perma.cc/
MD2G-W7CS]; Sarah Stillman, Get Out of Jail, Inc., NEW YORKER (June 23, 2014), http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/23/get-out-of-jail-inc [https://perma.cc/ 7AX3-HK7Q].
27. In addition to contributing to a growing body of scholarship expressing concerns with
the use of economic sanctions, this investigation of the role of counsel in Ferguson adds to
literature that conceives of individual defense representation as generative of systemic
reform. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Agenda Setting as a Tactic in Institutional Criminal Defense,
41 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 29, 29 (2015) (arguing that indigent defense
counsel have the “ability to set the agenda for the legal system by coordinating the
identification and pursuit of legal claims in appellate courts”); Margareth Etienne, The Ethics
of Cause Lawyering: An Empirical Examination of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Cause
Lawyers, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1195, 1212-13 (2005) (describing results of a
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Although I argue that individual defense representation can cre-
ate powerful political leverage, particularly in places like Ferguson,
I recognize that counsel’s power in this role is limited both by the
breadth and severity of criminal law, which provides prosecutors
with the power to force pleas even where defense representation
exists,28 as well as the chronic underfunding of indigent defense
systems across the United States.29 And while access to effective
counsel has been shown to have a positive effect on case outcomes,30
qualitative study of defense lawyers and noting that defense lawyers see themselves as
criminal justice system reformers in ways similar to cause lawyers in other substantive
arenas); Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1049, 1074-76
(2013) (describing holistic defense models employed by The Bronx Defenders, the San
Francisco Public Defender Office, and the Minneapolis Legal Rights Center, which provide
individual representation and advocacy targeted at changing social policies); Jonathan A.
Rapping, Returning Gideon’s Trumpet: Telling the Story in the Context of Today’s Criminal-
Justice Crisis, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1225, 1226 (2014) (book review) (“[T]hat a strong public
defender system is necessary to achieve systemic reform ... because of the role the public
defender plays in interrupting a process that is increasingly designed to convict and punish
poor people en masse and because of the potential of a strong community of public defenders
to galvanize the movement needed to push for important policy reform”); Jenny Roberts,
Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1099-1100 (2013) (arguing
that an increase in misdemeanor trials would result in costs that would have systemic effects
on prosecutorial charging, policing, and legislative decision-making). 
28. See, e.g., infra notes 353-54 and accompanying text.
29. There is an expansive literature on the effects of underfunding indigent defense
counsel. See, e.g., Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases,
A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1039-40 (2006); Alexandra Natapoff, Misde-
meanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1341-42 (2012); Eve Brensike Primus, Culture as a
Structural Problem in Indigent Defense, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1769, 1783-90 (2016).
30. Studies of the provision of counsel at bail hearings are particularly apt, given the
similarities in arguments related to the defendant’s financial circumstances both in bail
determinations and in the setting and collection of economic sanctions. Compare Douglas L.
Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right to
Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1743-44 (2002) (describing the use of the
defendant’s financial circumstances in bail hearings), with infra Parts I.A.3-4 (regarding
arguments related to a defendant’s ability to pay economic sanctions available at sentencing
pursuant to the Excessive Fines Clause and during collections). For example, in a randomized
control experiment of bail hearings in Baltimore, researchers found that represented
defendants were over two-and-a-half times more likely to be released on a personal
recognizance bond than unrepresented defendants. See Colbert et al., supra, at 1752-53. Of
those defendants upon whom the court imposed bail, represented defendants were over four
times more likely to have bail reduced; where reductions occurred, the average reduction for
represented defendants was nearly $1000 as compared to $166 for unrepresented defendants;
and those who were represented were significantly more likely to have bail set at less than
$500. See id. at 1753-55; see also id. at 1747-48 (describing early studies—the Manhattan Bail
Project in the 1960s and the Evaluation of Early Representation by Defense Counsel Field
Test in the 1980s—which also showed that defendants had better outcomes when represented
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where counsel fails to provide zealous representation, individual
defendants may end up worse off in terms of the results of their
individual cases.31 The presence of ineffective counsel, therefore,
risks creating a constitutional stamp of approval on what is actually
a deficient system that merely entrenches the legal and political
status quo.32 Both scholars and advocates have provided compelling
arguments regarding why such systems are unjust and how they
should be reformed.33 I agree that such reforms must take place and
by counsel at bail hearings).
31. See, e.g., James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer
Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154, 191-97
(2012) (examining random assignment of counsel and determining that, compared to ap-
pointed private counsel, public defenders had significantly better results as measured by both
conviction rate and severity of sentencing in part because judges may assign counsel who file
fewer pretrial motions and raise fewer factual claims, and because the flat-fee compensation
system disincentivizes zealous advocacy); Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile
Court: An Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1330-31 (1989) (finding that juveniles represented by counsel fared
worse with regard to severity of disposition than those who were not represented and offering
as one explanation a lack of competence of counsel). Recently, Erica Hashimoto engaged in
an analysis of federal misdemeanor cases from 2000 through 2005 and determined that pro
se defendants were more likely to have favorable sentencing outcomes for all case types other
than driving under the influence. See Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Represen-
tation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 489-94 (2007). While Hashimoto used the best available
data, the study had serious limitations. The federal court administrators failed to code wheth-
er defendants were pro se or represented in one-third of the cases in the data set—over 19,000
cases—which may have had a significant effect on the study’s results. See id. at 489 n.128.
Further, as Hashimoto notes, the data cannot convey whether the pro se defendants’ cases
were significantly weaker. See id. at 495. The study also does not control for race, gender,
criminal history, and the like, all of which have been tied to sentencing outcomes. See, e.g.,
David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the
U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 311-12 (2001); Crystal S. Yang, Free at Last?
Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 75, 90-95
(2015). Therefore, while Hashimoto’s study raises critical questions regarding why federal
misdemeanants appear to be better off without representation, it cannot say whether the
presence or absence of counsel is a causal factor driving those results. Cf. Roberts, supra note
27, at 1123-24 (discussing Hashimoto, supra).
32. See Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J.
2176, 2179-81 (2013); see also Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon and Expanding Alternatives
to Lawyers, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1288 (2013) (describing underfunded defense sys-
tems as providing “Potemkin lawyering, a costly charade far removed from Gideon’s vision”);
Jonathan A. Rapping, Directing the Winds of Change: Using Organizational Culture to Reform
Indigent Defense, 9 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 177, 193 (2008) (noting that underfunding and struc-
tural issues result in attorneys seeing themselves as “a cog in the judge’s machinery that func-
tions to move cases through court quickly”).
33. See, e.g., John Pfaff, Opinion, A Mockery of Justice for the Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/30/opinion/a-mockery-of-justice-for-the-poor.html
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in fact call in this Article for indigent defense representation to be
given more political and doctrinal attention.34 But it is also impor-
tant to recognize that even under current conditions, public
defenders are capable of doing important work.35 Even in an imper-
fect system—including in Ferguson, where change is occurring even
though there is no indigent defense system and so only a fraction of
defendants are represented—indigent defense representation has a
key role to play in challenging systems of governance. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I is descriptive. In it, I
document how Ferguson’s municipal court system flouted constitu-
tional rules through its design at adjudication, at sentencing, and
in its post-sentencing collections practices.36 By doing so, Ferguson
maintained a system of governance in which the revenue-generating
capacity of its court was prized over fair treatment of the most
politically vulnerable members of its community. I also detail the
role individual defense attorneys have played, in conjunction with
social justice activists, civil rights litigators, and the Department of
Justice, in achieving significant reforms in Ferguson.37 These re-
forms have included the elimination of certain court fees and a
particularly ubiquitous ordinance, relief for people burdened with
ongoing debt related to economic sanctions, and the replacement of
the officials in positions holding the most power over its court
system, but have not yet included the creation of a public defender
system.
In Part II, I consider what the events in Ferguson might teach us
about the role indigent defense representation can play in criminal
justice reform elsewhere. In particular, by litigating individual
cases, counsel can alter the cost-benefit of crime policy decisions
made by lawmakers, prosecutors, and police. Further, individual
defense representation can inform the public debate by forcing the
government to respond to allegations of improper governance and
by identifying patterns of abuse. The power of counsel to create
[https://perma.cc/E3NZ-V8CT] (calling for federal funding for indigent defense).
34. See infra Part III.B.
35. See David Alan Sklansky, Lecture, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 567, 580 (2008) (offering a “conservative estimate” of 300,000 dismissals of criminal
charges each year based on Fourth Amendment challenges alone).
36. See infra Part I.A.
37. See infra Part I.B.
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fiscal and political pressure will be greatest in jurisdictions that
share certain characteristics with Ferguson: a dependence upon
criminal systems to generate revenue, a pattern of unconstitutional
activity, or the targeting of economically vulnerable communities.
Still, because indigent defense litigation creates system costs and
forces the government to explain its behavior in other settings, it
serves as a check even where systemic abuses are less prevalent. I
also consider how the unique circumstances in Ferguson—in partic-
ular, the public attention to the municipality created by the shoot-
ing of Michael Brown and advocacy efforts of civil rights litigators,
the Department of Justice, and social justice advocates— support
the need for indigent defense counsel. Yet, even setting aside these
conditions, the work of pro bono attorneys engaged in traditional
indigent defense representation in even a handful of cases has
created both fiscal and political pressure on Ferguson officials.
Because in most jurisdictions abuses go without the public scrutiny
and various forms of advocacy seen in Ferguson, access to individual
defense counsel becomes that much more significant. 
In Part III, I examine theoretical and normative implications that
may be drawn in two areas from the work of individual defense
counsel in Ferguson. A full examination of these areas of inquiry is
beyond the scope of this Article, but the experience in Ferguson
provides useful insight nonetheless. First, I consider how Ferguson
fits within an ongoing scholarly debate over whether constitutional
criminal procedural rules or local government controls over
procedure serve as a better check against criminal justice abuses.
Ferguson provides an opportunity to test the terms of the debate in
a system where low-level offenses are punished through economic
sanctions. Placing control over procedure in the hands of local gov-
ernment creates risks too great: that revenue generation will take
priority over fair process, that historical practices of targeting poor
and particularly black communities for low-level offenses will con-
tinue, and that policing that violates constitutional procedural rules
will aid in manufacturing convictions necessary to support court
systems’ revenue-generating capacity. I posit, therefore, that the ex-
perience in Ferguson supports keeping constitutional procedural
rules within defense counsel’s arsenal to serve as a check on gov-
ernmental overreach.
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Second, this investigation into Ferguson illustrates two problems
that arise when access to counsel is thought of too narrowly, as
purely an individual constitutional right. One, lawmakers can use
the constitutional pedigree of the right to obscure the political
choices they make to deny counsel. And two, although the ability of
defense counsel to seek the enforcement of constitutional rights that
protect against government abuse is critical to counsel’s systemic
effect, the right to counsel doctrine is myopically focused on the role
counsel plays in securing negative liberties and ignores the ways in
which defense representation functions as a component of participa-
tory democracy. By overlooking how access to counsel supports that
core democratic value, the right to counsel doctrine fails to recognize
an independent and important reason for the recognition of a robust
right. With these problems in mind, those seeking broad criminal
justice reform should include access to indigent defense representa-
tion as a prominent part of both political and doctrinal efforts at
systemic reform.
I. FERGUSON
What follows is a comparison between the Ferguson municipal
court system as it existed for decades before the shooting of Michael
Brown in August of 2014, and after. The comparison begins with a
description of a litany of constitutional rules violated in Ferguson,38
and ends by providing a picture of how a group of pro bono attorneys
providing indigent defense representation in a handful of cases—
along with civil rights litigators, the Department of Justice, and
social justice activists—were integral in creating meaningful change
to the operation of criminal justice in Ferguson.39
A. Ferguson’s Municipal Court System Before the Shooting of
Michael Brown
Before the shooting of Michael Brown turned public attention
toward Ferguson, city officials there maintained a municipal court
system in which charges were pursued overwhelmingly against
38. See infra Part I.A.
39. See infra Part I.B.
1184 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:1171
members of the region’s poor and black communities, in which
convictions and economic sanctions were issued perfunctorily, and
in which people who were too poor to pay those sanctions were
routinely incarcerated.40 As a result of these and other abuses, the
municipal courts generated millions of dollars in revenue for the city
of Ferguson each year.41
A key component of this system was that Ferguson officials took
no steps to provide indigent defense counsel.42 At the time, pro bono
representation—primarily provided by legal aid attorneys from the
ArchCity Defenders and students at university legal clinics—served
as defense counsel for only a fraction of defendants, leaving the vast
majority of defendants unrepresented.43 Even that representation
did not result in significant litigation, as—for reasons detailed fur-
ther below—the municipal court quickly disposed of cases in which
counsel appeared.44 As a result, Ferguson was able to sidestep litiga-
ting numerous constitutional violations.45
To be clear, I do not claim that Ferguson officials intentionally
denied counsel in order to entrench the ability to use the municipal
court system to raise revenue, to criminalize particular conduct,
or to support particular forms of policing; they may or may not
have. Rather, I claim that, regardless of intent, for decades Fergu-
son officials were able to maintain a system of governance in which
the police and municipal courts were used to generate revenue at
the expense of the most politically vulnerable members of the com-
munity,46 at least in part because defense counsel was not available
40. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 2-5.
41. See id. at 9-10.
42. See id. at 58.
43. Pro bono representation was afforded by the ArchCity Defenders, St. Louis University
Criminal Defense Clinic, Washington University School of Law Juvenile Law and Justice
Clinic, and a few private practitioners, but only in an estimated 10 to 25 percent of cases. See
Balko, supra note 2; see also Harvey Interview, supra note 1 (describing appearing at
Ferguson’s municipal court and witnessing hundreds of people without counsel).
44. See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
45. See infra Parts I.A.1-4.
46. See T.E. Lauer, Prolegomenon to Municipal Court Reform in Missouri, 31 MO. L. REV.
69, 86-94 (1966) (describing Missouri’s municipal court practices as including a focus on
revenue generation, the unnecessary use of arrest warrants and incarceration, procedures
that resulted in multiple hearings on even minor offenses, and practices that made court
appearances difficult for many defendants); see also id. at 90 (“It is clear that many
municipalities have at times conceived of their municipal courts in terms of their revenue-
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to raise legal challenges to these practices. Thus, Ferguson is
illustrative of how a system in which counsel is denied allows
constitutional deficiencies to flourish in a manner that supports
the use of court systems as tools for revenue generation. 
1. System Design
Ferguson’s municipal court system was designed to maximize its
revenue-generating potential.47 That design, however, left Ferguson
in violation of long-standing due process limitations on pecuniary
interests in economic sanctions. Beginning in the 1920s, the U.S.
Supreme Court repeatedly struck down systems designed so that
actors with adjudicative authority regarding economic sanctions
were in a position where they may have been tempted to base
decisions not on fairness, but on either a desire to generate revenue
for the government or to satisfy their own pecuniary interests.48
Evidence of governmental self-dealing exists where (1) the amount
of revenue to be generated from fines is substantial enough that it
is critical to the jurisdiction’s financial stability49 or offsets the need
for increased taxation;50 (2) the system’s design places those with
power over the outcome of an investigation or trial in the position of
having partisan interests in governmental finances;51 or (3) the
volume of cases brought onto the court’s docket appears to be driven
by an interest in revenue generation.52 Evidence of individual
raising ability, and that local law enforcement and administration of justice have been run
with disproportionate emphasis upon alleviating the burden upon the local taxpayers.”).
47. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 9.
48. See Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 249-51 (1977) (per curiam); Ward v. Village of
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 59-62 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 520, 522-23, 535 (1927).
These same principles existed in the common law prior to the Court’s first pronouncement.
See Lauer, supra note 46, at 90 (“At common law, ... it was settled as to municipal courts ‘that
the municipal corporation could bring no action therein against a stranger where the effect
would be to benefit the corporation or increase its funds, for that would be to make the
corporation itself both judge and party.’” (quoting 2 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 741
(5th ed. 1911))).
49. See Ward, 409 U.S. at 58.
50. See Tumey, 273 U.S. at 533.
51. See Ward, 409 U.S. at 58 n.1 (describing mayor’s control over police chief’s determin-
ation of filing charges); Tumey, 273 U.S. at 533-34 (describing mayor’s dual role as judicial
officer and county executive).
52. See Ward, 409 U.S. at 58 n.1 (citing police chief’s testimony that the mayor ordered
him to charge violations in the municipal, rather than county, court whenever possible so that
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pecuniary interests exists where the actor stands to directly benefit
from a decision of whether to impose a sanction, for example, by
receiving even a small, direct payment of an administrative fee
assessed.53 Officials can avoid both improper governmental-interest
and self-dealing problems by walling off actors with adjudicatory
power from the jurisdiction’s finances and executive functions, and
ensuring that adjudicators receive no personal financial gain related
to adjudicatory decision-making apart from a salary set independent
of case outcome.54 But where either governmental or personal pe-
cuniary interests may taint decisions leading to the imposition of
economic sanctions, the system “necessarily involves a lack of due
process of law.”55
Despite these long-standing constitutional rules, Ferguson is
highly dependent upon economic sanctions for its financial stability.
Its revenues from economic sanctions reached nearly 2.6 million
dollars in 2013, constituting over 20 percent of total revenue in its
general fund.56 Before the Department of Justice began its investi-
gation into Ferguson’s use of economic sanctions, the city’s 2015
revenues from fines and fees were projected to exceed 3 million
dollars, jumping to nearly 25 percent of the city’s general fund.57 It
is evident that Ferguson used economic sanctions to fund services
unrelated to the crime of conviction, thereby avoiding the need to
generate tax revenue for such services. For example, a conviction for
having weeds in one’s yard carries mandatory surcharges for a
crime victim’s compensation fund, an “Inmate Prisoner Detainee
Security” fund, and a fund for the local domestic violence shelter.58
the village could retain economic sanctions imposed); Tumey, 273 U.S. at 521 (describing
mayor’s statement that the town’s “Liquor Court” would only operate when the town is short
on funds).
53. See Connally, 429 U.S. at 246 (five dollars per warrant issued); Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523
(twelve dollars in costs per conviction).
54. See Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1928) (finding no due process violation where
mayor had exclusively judicial responsibilities and no opportunity to personally benefit from
decisions rendered).
55. See Tumey, 273 U.S. at 534 (emphasis added).
56. CITY OF FERGUSON, MO., ANNUAL OPERATING BUDGET: FISCAL YEAR 2014-2015, at 50
(2014) [hereinafter 2014-15 BUDGET], http://www.fergusoncity.com/documentcenter/view/1701
[https://perma.cc/J57L-V5X2].
57. Id.; see also FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 9-10. 
58. See FERGUSON MUN. COURT, VIOLATIONS BUREAU SCHEDULE OF OFFENSES AND FINES
(Apr. 1, 2015) [hereinafter FERGUSON VIOLATIONS SCHEDULE], https://www.fergusoncity.com/
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Further, not only did Ferguson officials fail to wall off adjudica-
tive actors, they maintained a system in which those responsible for
the assessment and collection of economic sanctions had partisan
interests in raising revenue for the city. The Department of Justice
investigation revealed that, in order to capture the maximum
amount of economic sanctions, Ferguson instituted a court system
that not only matched the practices outlawed in prior Supreme
Court cases, but exceeded them in the intricacy by which the actors
in the system operated together to achieve that end.59
In Ferguson, the city manager is the chief executive officer,
responsible for Ferguson’s financial affairs.60 The city manager
supervises the chief of police, and the chief of police oversees the
municipal court, which operates as a component of, and physically
inside of, the police department.61 For a judge to be appointed to the
municipal court, she must first be selected by the city manager,
followed by approval of the city council.62 Appointment of the
prosecutor is also subject to approval of the city manager.63 Court
staff report directly to the chief of police, including the court clerk,
who is authorized under the city’s municipal code to accept guilty
pleas and dispose of charges without judicial oversight.64 In other
words, although the city manager did not himself have the ability
to convict, acquit, or sentence, he selected and supervised those who
did.
The various players with adjudicative power in Ferguson’s mu-
nicipal court system worked hand in hand with the city manager to
ensure that revenue generation was prioritized. Take, for example,
the court clerk, who, as noted above, had the power to dispose of
charges.65 Ferguson city officials consulted the court clerk with
respect to how to improve revenue generation and to set goals
regarding how much funding the court might generate in a given
DocumentCenter/View/1829 [https://perma.cc/YS6X-VQGW].
59. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 9-15.
60. Id. at 7.
61. Id. at 7-8.
62. Id. at 8.
63. See ARCHCITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 36.
64. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 8.
65. See id. at 8, 47.
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year.66 In turn, the court clerk put pressure on other actors to work
toward revenue generation. Emails located by the Department of
Justice, for example, revealed that the court clerk prodded a prose-
cutor to seek higher economic sanctions with the warning, “We need
to keep up our revenue.”67 
Ferguson’s prosecutors also had adjudicative power in Ferguson’s
system, as they were given authority to deny requests for extensions
of time to pay debts stemming from economic sanctions.68 This
occurred with apparent regularity so that prosecutors could “aid in
the court’s efficient collection of its fines.”69 That prosecutors in St.
Louis County’s municipalities felt intertwined with the court as a
revenue-generating partner is also obvious from a comment made
by a prosecutor who agreed to reduce a fine after a plea negotiation
with a pro bono attorney from the ArchCity Defenders: “You’re tak-
ing money right out of my pocket, here.”70
Willingness to use economic sanctions to generate revenue was a
key component of the judicial role in Ferguson as well. Court costs
are set by the Missouri Supreme Court and legislature, but the state
leaves open a gray area in which municipal courts appear free to
impose additional fees.71 When Ferguson municipal court Judge
Ronald Brockmeyer was appointed to the bench in 2003, he took
advantage of that gray area and created a list of new fees related to
missed payments and court appearances that the Department of
Justice described as “abusive” and possibly “unlawful.”72 In a 2011
city finance director’s report, Judge Brockmeyer was quoted as
saying that “none of these changes could have taken place without
the cooperation of the Court Clerk, the Chief of Police, and the
Prosecutor’s Office.”73 
66. See id.
67. Id. at 14-15.
68. See id. at 14.
69. See id. (quoting an acting Ferguson prosecutor).
70. Balko, supra note 2.
71. See “St. Louis on the Air”: Law Professionals Discuss Court Fines and Fees, ST. LOUIS
PUB. RADIO (Sept. 30, 2014), http://cpa.ds.npr.org/kwmu/audio/2014/09/093014aweb.mp3
[https://perma.cc/P69P-NA74] (discussing Missouri’s rules regarding costs and fees with
Overland, Missouri, municipal court Judge Frank Vatterott).
72. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 14. 
73. Id. (quoting Ferguson finance director’s 2011 report).
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Prosecutors and the municipal judges also cooperated to avoid
expenditures of municipal resources by dismissing or reducing
charges in many of the handful of cases in which the defendant was
represented by counsel.74 Obtaining a favorable outcome often took
only a single phone call to the prosecutor.75 It was important for the
system’s revenue-generating function to handle most represented
cases in this manner.
Not only does access to counsel create a risk that the court will be
faced with evidentiary and constitutional challenges of the kind
described herein,76 it also carries the threat of case removal. Under
Missouri law, municipal court defendants have an opportunity to
have a case removed to an associate circuit court for adjudication,
a process that eliminates the “home court advantage” of an appear-
ance before Ferguson’s municipal court, increasing the likelihood of
a favorable outcome,77 while also enlarging prosecution costs.
Unrepresented defendants were seemingly unaware of the possibil-
ity of removal and simply did not seek the opportunity to be heard
outside of the Ferguson municipal court.78 By quickly resolving
cases of represented defendants, the municipality avoided potential
removal costs. 
The Department of Justice’s review of court records also showed
that, in addition to installing new fees and resolving those few cases
74. See BETTER TOGETHER, PUBLIC SAFETY—MUNICIPAL COURTS 3 (2014) [hereinafter
BETTER TOGETHER, MUNICIPAL COURTS], http://www.bettertogetherstl.com/wp-content/
uploads/2014/10/BT-Municipal-Courts-Report-Full-Report1.pdf [https://perma.cc/PB3T-CC6X]
(“Lawyers get ‘no-points’ deals and dismissals for their clients; the unrepresented defendants
do not.”); Harvey Interview, supra note 1 (describing the experience of routinely having cases
dismissed or charges significantly reduced after appearing as counsel, but also noting that the
vast majority of defendants appeared without counsel).
75. See Balko, supra note 2; Harvey Interview, supra note 1. In at least one case in which
the defendant retained counsel, Ferguson prosecutors appeared to have been so disorganized
that they contended at various points that the charges had been dismissed or pled down, when
neither had actually occurred. See Tony Messenger, Ferguson’s Bumbling Court Costs Naval
Vet His Security Clearance, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 13, 2016), http://www.stltoday.
com/news/local/columns/tony-messenger/messenger-ferguson-s-bumbling-court-costs-naval-
vet-his-security/article_69279932-8959-5f04-9c68-d046fd18d925.html [https://perma.cc/AY4W-
NDLG].
76. See infra Parts I.A.2-4.
77. See Harvey Interview, supra note 1.
78. This outcome is evident in the increase in prosecutor costs related to hearings in the
associate circuit courts in recent months as greater numbers of defendants have gained legal
representation. See infra notes 231-43 and accompanying text.
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where counsel appeared, Judge Brockmeyer was not attending to
other aspects of his job. The Department’s Report noted that he
“often times does not listen to the testimony, does not review the
reports or the criminal history of defendants, and doesn’t let all the
pertinent witnesses testify before rendering a verdict.”79 In one of
the few cases where a defendant was both represented and the rep-
resentation did not result in a favorable resolution of the case
without a hearing, Judge Brockmeyer interrupted counsel’s at-
tempts to cross-examine the officer and threatened to incarcerate
the attorney for contempt if he continued to assert a defense for his
client.80 For those without counsel who chose to challenge the
charges against them, Judge Brockmeyer would often add additional
charges and fees, or even have those who asked questions or at-
tempted to put on a defense arrested for contempt of court.81
Improprieties in the courtroom were swept aside, however, be-
cause Judge Brockmeyer was so effective at generating revenue.82
When the city manager nominated him for reappointment, a city
council member expressed concerns about judicial fairness.83 The
city manager responded by stating, “[i]t goes without saying the
City cannot afford to lose any efficiency in our Courts, nor experi-
ence any decrease in our Fines and Forfeitures.”84
Arguably, Judge Brockmeyer’s refusal to actually adjudicate
innocence or guilt meant that the adjudicative decision maker was,
in effect, the police officer who initially chose to file a charge or issue
a ticket. As Alexandra Natapoff has explained, in low-level offenses
of the kind enforced in Ferguson, “evidence and law are displaced by
the fact of selection itself: it becomes more accurate to say that they
were convicted because they were arrested, and that they may have
been arrested for any number of nonevidentiary reasons.”85 In
Ferguson, stops equated to convictions, so officers were encouraged
79. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 43 n.22 (quoting a Ferguson city council member).
80. See id. at 44.
81. See id. at 48-49.
82. Id. at 15.
83. See id.
84. Id. (alteration in original).
85. Natapoff, supra note 29, at 1354; see also id. at 1318 (“[W]here protective procedures
are weakest, enforcement selection processes—not evidence or substantive law—effectively
determine who will be convicted.”).
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to write multiple tickets during every stop in order to generate the
maximum amount of revenue;86 in one case an officer issued four-
teen separate tickets in a single stop.87
Finally, the volume of cases to reach Ferguson’s municipal court
also is indicative of a pecuniary interest in revenue generation. The
chief of police made staffing and other policy decisions in order to
increase the volume of cases, rather than improve public safety. For
example, in March 2010, the city finance director alerted the chief
of police that “unless ticket writing ramps up significantly before
the end of the year, it will be hard to significantly raise collections
next year.... Given that we are looking at a substantial sales tax
shortfall, it’s not an insignificant issue.”88 The chief responded by
stating that he could generate more revenue with shift changes,
which were then put in place.89 Similarly, the finance director and
city manager worked with the chief of police to develop new initia-
tives designed to “fill the revenue pipeline,” including a scheme to
balance the use of highway traffic enforcement and red light cam-
eras so as to achieve the highest possible revenues without exceed-
ing a statutory cap on the amount of revenues municipalities were
allowed to generate through fines.90 Further, because the Ferguson
municipal ordinance code largely overlaps with the Missouri state
code, and therefore charges may be filed in either county or munic-
ipal courts,91 the police filed charges in the municipal system when-
ever possible, thereby increasing the volume of cases and the
amount of revenue generated.92
In addition to the overwhelming evidence that adjudicative actors
in Ferguson’s system were motivated to increase the city’s revenue,
86. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 11.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 10; see also id. at 13 (quoting an email from the city finance director: “Court fees
are anticipated to rise about 7.5%. I did ask the Chief if he thought the PD could deliver 10%
increase. He indicated they could try.”).
89. Id. at 10.
90. See id. at 13-14.
91. See id. at 7. 
92. See id.; cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 58 n.1 (1972) (describing a
mayor’s order that a police chief file cross-listed charges in the mayor’s court so the
municipality could retain economic sanctions). Both the overlap of municipal and state codes
and the role of law enforcement in directing code violations to municipal courts in order to
retain fees is long-standing in Ferguson and elsewhere. See Lauer, supra note 46, at 77, 90.
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it is also arguable that at least some of these actors had a personal
pecuniary interest at stake. Emails reveal that police officers were
informed that their salaries may be held stagnant or that they may
be given worse assignments if they did not aggressively ticket, and
that promotions may be in order for those who generated significant
revenue.93 And though salaries for other system actors were
apparently set without a linkage to the amount of fines generated,
the Department of Justice found that “City officials, including the
Municipal Judge, the Court Clerk, and [Ferguson Police Depart-
ment] supervisors [were] assisting friends, colleagues, acquain-
tances, and themselves in eliminating citations, fines, and fees.”94
Because one person may serve as a prosecutor in one town and a
judge in another, the practice of fixing tickets expanded across
municipalities, making the personal pecuniary benefit of avoiding
an economic sanction “routine.”95
In sum, far from providing a neutral arbiter, adjudicative actors
in Ferguson’s system worked “primarily ... to compel the payment
of fines and fees that advance[d] the City’s financial interests,”96 and
perhaps their own. Ferguson’s practices clearly violated long-stand-
ing constitutional restrictions on pecuniary interests in judicial
systems.
2. Adjudication
The system of governance in Ferguson was also grounded on the
municipal court’s ability to render faulty convictions based on
93. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 11-12.
94. Id. at 74.
95. See id. at 75. In addition to the personal pecuniary benefit of avoiding the costs of
tickets, at least one example has been covered of a possible use of the area’s municipal courts
to procure favors with financial value: a prosecutor in Frontenac, a town neighboring Fer-
guson, purportedly dropped underage drinking charges against the daughter of a wealthy
businessman in exchange for free golf at a prestigious local club. See Jeremy Kohler et al.,
Municipal Courts Are Well-Oiled Money Machine, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 15, 2015),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/municipal-courts-are-well-oiled-money-
machine/article_2f45bafb-6e0d-5e9e-8fel-0ab9a794fcdc.html [https://perma.cc/B5KJ-QND7]
(quoting an email from an associate circuit court judge to the prosecutor as saying, “Her Dad
is Wayne Baker (owner of Warrenton Oil and a ----load of other stuff).... Can we make this one
go away??? By the way, we’re hooked up for golf at Porto Cima at the Conference!!! (is no cost
okay???)!!”).
96. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 3.
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evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment,97 issued
without sufficient evidence of the charged offense in violation of due
process,98 or based on ordinances that are likely unconstitutional as
written or as applied.99 
The Ferguson police department routinely violated the Fourth
Amendment in relation to claims processed in its municipal courts.
The Department of Justice’s review of police records revealed
“numerous incidents in which—based on the officer’s own descrip-
tion of the detention—an officer detained an individual without
articulable reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or arrested a
person without probable cause.”100 This includes arrests based on so-
called “wanteds”—a statewide database in which Missouri law
enforcement share a list of people who they want arrested, but for
whom they have not sought an arrest warrant.101 Though the
database is intended to include only cases for which there is prob-
able cause for arrest, the Ferguson police routinely issued “wanteds”
precisely because they did not have probable cause.102 Ferguson
police also practiced a technique they called “ped checks,” which
involved stopping pedestrians without any suspicion of criminal
activity103 in violation of even the low reasonable suspicion standard
mandated by Terry v. Ohio.104
97. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
98. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (“The government must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt every element of a charged offense.”).
99. See infra notes 111-19.
100. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 17.
101. Id. at 22.
102. See id. at 22-23.
103. See id. at 18.
104. See 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). In June 2016, the Supreme Court decided Utah v. Strieff,
in which it held that evidence found in an unconstitutional stop is not subject to the exclu-
sionary rule if, in the course of the stop, the police determine that the person was subject to
an active warrant. 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016). As Justice Sotomayor pointed out in a fierce
dissent, in jurisdictions like Ferguson where the municipal court issues thousands of warrants
related to inability to pay, see infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text, this renders an
already lenient Fourth Amendment essentially moot, see Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2068-71
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The Court’s articulation of its holding, however, emphasized both
that the warrant must be valid, and that a pattern of stopping citizens without reasonable
suspicion or probable cause may justify the application of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 2059,
2062-63 (majority opinion). As a result, indigent defense counsel retains an opportunity to
seek the exclusion of evidence in Ferguson. Further, limited as it may be, the Fourth
Amendment right is reinforced in a system in which counsel is afforded, because there would
be both a reduction in the number of convictions and a limitation on economic sanctions to
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Convictions in Ferguson were also obtained without evidence of
all elements of the offense in violation of due process. Fourth
Amendment violations played a key role in many such cases. Take,
for instance, the ordinance prohibiting “Failure to Comply,” an
element of which is that the police have issued a lawful order.105
Convictions for failure to comply were a mainstay in Ferguson’s
municipal court.106 Ferguson police had a practice of ordering people
to stop without having the requisite probable cause or reasonable
suspicion needed to meet the element that the order to stop be
lawful; when a person would not stop, the police would then arrest
her for failure to comply.107 Even setting aside Fourth Amendment
violations, obviously deficient charges were pursued. For example,
the Department of Justice described an incident in which five people
were approached by an officer who claimed to smell marijuana.108
The officer arrested all five for the crime of “gathering in a group for
the purposes of committing illegal activity,” despite the fact that he
found no marijuana, and therefore had no evidence of illegal
activity, which was a necessary element of the offense.109 
Not only were convictions obtained in Ferguson without satisfac-
tion of the elements of the offense, the ordinances that formed the
basis of many convictions were unconstitutional as written or as
applied. For example, certain ordinances appear to be unconstitu-
tional in that they prohibit legal activity, such as ordinances
requiring occupancy permits that may be used to preclude people
from hosting overnight guests.110 Other ordinances, including the
failure to comply statute used so ubiquitously in Ferguson, appear
amounts that are feasible for defendants to pay. As a result, there would be a drastic
reduction in the number of warrants issued by the court, meaning that the Strieff exception
would be triggered less frequently.
105. See FERGUSON, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 29, art. II, § 29-16(1) (2016).
106. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 19-22. 
107. See id. at 19-20. 
108. See id. at 18.
109. Id. For similar examples in Baltimore and New York City, see Natapoff, supra note
29, at 1359.
110. See FERGUSON, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 7, art. VII, § 7-145.6 (2016). Compare
Balko, supra note 2 (describing a hearing involving a woman ticketed for allowing her
boyfriend to spend the night in her apartment in a neighboring municipality in which the
prosecuting attorney argued “nothing good happens after 10pm”), with Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that there is a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
intimate sexual contact between consenting adults).
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to be unconstitutionally vague. That ordinance prohibits “disobeying
a lawful order in a way that hinders an officer’s duties.”111 As the
Department of Justice noted, the meaning of “hinders an officer’s
duties” provides too much discretion to the police and inadequate
notice to the public as to what behaviors might be criminal,112 so
much so that it is used interchangeably with a separate charge for
“Failure to Obey.”113 This certainly suggests the ordinance is
unconstitutionally vague.114
In addition to being deficient as written, the failure to comply
statute also suffers from constitutional infirmity as applied. The
ordinance requires that people identify themselves to the police
when asked.115 The Supreme Court has held that an arrest for the
failure to provide identification is only constitutional where an
officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior and the
request for identification is “reasonably related to the circumstances
justifying the stop.”116 But Ferguson police are trained to ask for
identification of all passengers during a traffic stop—despite having
no reasonable suspicion that the passengers are engaged in criminal
activity—and to arrest anyone who refuses.117 Other ordinances are
also applied unconstitutionally, including the municipality’s
contempt of court ordinance, which Judge Brockmeyer used against
people who refused to answer questions related to guilt, in violation
of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.118 
To sum up, Ferguson regularly obtained convictions supported by
evidence gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment, without
satisfying the elements of the charged ordinance, and through the
use of statutes that were unconstitutional on their face or as
111. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 19.
112. See id. at 19-21.
113. See id. at 52. Vagueness challenges may be particularly useful given that the Roberts
Court has shown an increased willingness to limit legislative authority over the reach of
criminal law. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015) (striking down
the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act).
114. Cf. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999) (striking down gang loitering
ordinance as unconstitutionally vague).
115. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 19.
116. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 184-85, 188 (2004).
117. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 21-22; see also Messenger, supra note 75
(discussing the filing of multiple bogus charges, including failure to comply, against a man
who declined to give a Ferguson police officer his Social Security Number).
118. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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applied. As a result, those convictions opened the door for the
municipal court to assess economic sanctions.
3. Sentencing
Once Ferguson obtained a conviction—constitutionally or not—
it amassed revenue by the imposition of fines and fees for low-level
offenses without consideration of a defendant’s ability to pay.119
In many—and perhaps most—cases in Ferguson, this practice trig-
gers the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.120 Because
excessiveness is measured by assessing whether economic sanc-
tions are grossly disproportionate to the offense of conviction, such
claims would have required consideration of both the seriousness of
the offense (or lack thereof) and the severity of the punishment on
119. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 44.
120. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). In Missouri, municipal court
practices are considered civil, rather than criminal. See MO. REV. STAT. § 479.011(2) (2016)
(granting authority for municipalities to establish “an administrative system for adjudicating
housing, property maintenance, nuisance, parking, and other civil, nonmoving municipal code
violations”). See generally Lauer, supra note 46, at 72-83. Despite the civil label, the Supreme
Court has held that, for purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause, the civil setting is immaterial
so long as the sanction imposed is at least partially punitive. See Austin v. United States, 509
U.S. 602, 609-10 (1993); cf. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 331 n.6, 343 n.18 (1998)
(suggesting in dicta that civil in rem forfeitures historically would not have been understood
as fines, but because forfeiture practices now blur the distinction between civil in rem and
criminal in personam forfeitures, civil forfeitures qualify as fines because they are at least
partially punitive). Though the Supreme Court has not had an opportunity to consider
whether administrative fees of the type assessed in Ferguson constitute “fines,” several lower
courts who have addressed the issue have determined that such fees are sufficiently punitive
to fall within the Clause’s ambit. See, e.g., Sloper v. City of Chicago, 23 N.E.3d 1208, 1210,
1214-16 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (fees for towing and storage of impounded vehicle following
arrest); State v. Griffin, 180 So. 3d 1262, 1269-70 (La. 2015) (prosecutor costs); State v. Boyd,
72 So. 3d 952, 953-55 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (court costs); State v. Polley, 2 S.W.3d 887, 894-95
(Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (investigation and prosecution costs).
In addition to the Excessive Fines Clause, another claim that may prove fruitful in
Ferguson remains largely undeveloped. That claim stems from an equal protection challenge
raised in Fuller v. Oregon, in which the Court upheld a fee recoupment statute because it
provided protections for those unable to pay, including a hearing at sentencing to determine
the defendant’s means and the effect of the sanction on the defendant, and further provided
the court authority to waive fees. See 417 U.S. 40, 45, 47-48 (1974). Whether a statute that
does not afford such protections violates the Equal Protection Clause remains an open
question. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 22 (1973) (noting that
the Supreme Court has yet to address the question of whether economic sanctions “must be
structured to reflect each person’s ability to pay in order to avoid disproportionate burdens”).
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those without the financial capacity to pay,121 both of which may
have greatly favored defendants in Ferguson. 
The seriousness of the offenses at issue in the Ferguson context
are uniquely low for two reasons. First, the municipal court is
restricted to addressing only the lowest-level offenses, including
both traffic offenses and nonmoving violations, such as having high
weeds and grass or excessive noise.122 While the government cer-
tainly has an interest in traffic safety, eliminating blight, and
keeping the public order,123 in terms of balancing crime seriousness
against punishment severity, as compared to higher-level offenses,
the seriousness of these types of violation remains low.124 Addition-
ally, beyond the general categorization of the offenses as low-level,
a defendant can attack offense seriousness on the basis of whether
his particular acts are less serious than all activity that might be
captured by a particular offense.125 For example, Ferguson police
ticketed a man for failure to wear a seatbelt when he was in fact not
wearing his seatbelt and therefore could be found to have committed
the offense and be subjected to a fine.126 The circumstances sur-
rounding his failure to wear a seatbelt, however, call into question
the seriousness of the offense in relation to the fines imposed. At the
time, he sat in a parked car next to a community park where he had
just finished playing basketball; he was sitting in his car for the
purpose of cooling down, not driving,127 arguably reducing the
121. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337.
122. See generally MO. REV. STAT. § 479.011.
123. See Andrea Marsh & Emily Gerrick, Why Motive Matters: Designing Effective Policy
Responses to Modern Debtors’ Prisons, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 115-16 (2015); Jason
Hancock & Lynn Horsley, KC Worries that State Legislation Restricting Municipal Courts
Would Prolong Blight, KAN. CITY STAR (Feb. 6, 2016, 7:05 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/
news/politics-government/article58919663.html [https://perma.cc/4NEF-B8PX].
124. Cf. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984) (noting that Wisconsin’s decision to
set the punishment for an offense as a monetary penalty rather than incarceration was a clear
indication of the state’s belief that the offense was comparatively less serious than other
offenses).
125. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337-39 (determining that the defendant was not within
the “class of persons” Congress intended to target with a law requiring reporting of currency
being transported overseas because the money that defendant transported was legitimately
owned, so he was not smuggling illicit funds).
126. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 3.
127. See id.
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seriousness of the offense because the failure to wear his seatbelt
did not implicate traffic safety. 
Second, Ferguson’s purposeful use of its ordinances to generate
revenue may call into question the seriousness of the offense. In
Harmelin v. Michigan, when speaking of the Excessive Fines
Clause, Justice Scalia noted that “it makes sense to scrutinize gov-
ernmental action more closely when the State stands to benefit.”128
Take, for example, the decision by city officials and police to in-
crease traffic enforcement in order to make up a projected sales tax
shortfall.129 The decision required police to rearrange staffing and
was carried out despite the fact that those staffing changes were
detrimental to community policing efforts.130 Such evidence that
Ferguson was using economic sanctions generated from ordinance
violations in part, and perhaps primarily, as revenue-generating
mechanisms rather than—or even despite—public safety needs calls
into question the seriousness of those violations of that ordinance. 
The other side of the excessiveness scale—the severity of the
punishment—also cuts in favor of the defense in most cases in Fer-
guson. Although the lower courts have split on whether a defen-
dant’s ability to pay an economic sanction is relevant to the exces-
siveness inquiry,131 the Eighth Circuit, where Ferguson resides,
considers the financial effect of the fine on the defendant a “critical
factor,”132 and the Supreme Court has also indicated that ability to
pay is relevant to an economic sanction’s constitutionality.133
128. 501 U.S. 957, 978 n.9 (1991).
129. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
130. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 10.
131. Compare United States v. Viloski, 814 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that the
effect of a fine on a defendant’s “livelihood” is relevant to excessiveness), petition for cert. filed,
No. 16-508 (U.S. Oct. 14, 2016), with United States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, 175 F.3d 1304,
1311 (11th Cir. 1999) (declining to consider financial effect).
132. See United States v. Hines, 88 F.3d 661, 664 (8th Cir. 1996).
133. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 335-36 (1998) (discussing how the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause’s roots are in a provision of Magna Carta that mandated consideration
of the effect of an amercement—a predecessor of the fine—on the defendant’s livelihood). For
a historical accounting of consideration of defendants’ ability to pay in colonial and early
American law, see Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV.
277, 330-35 (2014). Though defendants have access to evidence that would be used to establish
ability to pay, that does not mean that they are well-equipped to do so without assistance. Cf.
Joan Petersilia & Elizabeth Piper Deschenes, Perceptions of Punishment: Inmates and Staff
Rank the Severity of Prison Versus Intermediate Sanctions, 74 PRISON J. 306, 323 (1994)
(finding that inmates believed their chances of paying economic sanctions were significantly
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The constitutional relevance of a fine’s effect is no small matter,
particularly in a place like Ferguson where the unemployment rate
is 14 percent, 22 percent of the city’s citizens live below the poverty
line,134 and policing and court practices predominantly affect the
poor.135 It may be true that there are some cases where people have
sufficient income or assets to pay economic sanctions but choose not
to do so. But it is hard to imagine that people with means are rou-
tinely risking incarceration136 or the loss of housing, food, transpor-
tation, and other basic necessities137 by refusing to make a payment.
These penalties for being unable to pay can lead to a never-ending
cycle of debt and further sanctioning.138 If the Excessive Fines
Clause precludes a court from imposing a fine on a person who can-
not pay in the first instance, that cycle never starts. Of course, that
also means that the revenue from such sanctions will never accrue
to the municipality.
4. Collections
The constitutional deficiencies in Ferguson did not stop with the
structure of the system, adjudication of guilt, or sentencing; Fer-
guson’s system for collecting economic sanctions was also blatantly
unconstitutional because it violated the Supreme Court’s long-
standing prohibition on the automatic conversion of an economic
sanction into incarceration where the failure to pay the sanction is
due to the debtor’s inability to do so. In addition to prohibiting the
automatic conversion of economic sanctions to incarceration with
the debt forgiven at a particular dollar amount per day in the early
1970s,139 in the 1983 case Bearden v. Georgia, the Court also pro-
hibited automatic conversion through probation revocation where
higher than correctional staff believed inmates’ chances were).
134. See ARCHCITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 34-35.
135. See, e.g., supra note 6 and accompanying text.
136. See infra Part I.A.4.
137. See ARCHCITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 4.
138. See Balko, supra note 2.
139. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 399 (1971) (striking down on equal protection grounds
a statute that converted economic sanctions into incarceration at a rate of five dollars per day
served); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 236-37, 239 (1970) (same). Ferguson did not use a
pay-or-stay system because it did not provide any discount on debt for incarceration imposed;
rather, it imposed additional fees. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
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the terms of probation mandate payment.140 Implicit in its au-
tomatic conversion to incarceration decisions and explicit in its
probation revocation decision, the Court has required that a juris-
diction seeking to impose incarceration for the failure to pay an
economic sanction must first afford the debtor a full hearing—now
colloquially known as a Bearden hearing—to determine whether she
has the means to pay but has declined to do so, or whether the
failure to pay is due instead to indigency.141 When the debtor lacks
the means to pay, the court must consider alternate forms of pun-
ishment, such as a reduction of economic sanctions, a reasonable
payment plan, or community service.142 Absent some limited cir-
cumstance where those alternatives cannot satisfy the government’s
punitive and deterrent aims, incarceration for the failure to pay
economic sanctions is unconstitutional.143 
How, then, did it come to be that thousands of people in St. Louis
County were incarcerated or the subject of arrest warrants tied
directly to unpaid fines and fees without having an opportunity to
be heard on their ability to pay and without access to alternative
sanctions? The answer is simple: Ferguson officials did not adhere
to the Court’s long-standing prohibition.
The Ferguson municipal court’s use of arrest warrants auto-
matically converted economic sanctions into incarceration due to a
person’s inability to pay, albeit in a way slightly different than the
mechanisms addressed by the Court to date.144 The municipal court
issued two types of warrants designed to squeeze as much as
possible out of those living in poverty, and did so at a staggering
rate.145 In 2013 alone, the municipal court issued over 9000 war-
140. 461 U.S. 660, 668-69 (1983). 
141. See id. at 672.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 672-73; Tate, 401 U.S. at 400-01; Williams, 399 U.S. at 244.
144. See Fant v. City of Ferguson, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1031-32 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (finding
plaintiffs’ claim that Ferguson’s use of arrest warrants violated Tate was sufficient to survive
a motion to dismiss).
145. Cf. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) (No. 14-
1373) (Justice Kagan: “I was staggered by the number of arrest warrants that are out on
people.”). 
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rants for minor violations,146 a rate of nearly three warrants per
household.147 
The municipal court issued the first type of warrant for the
failure to pay previously ordered economic sanctions.148 In doing so,
the court failed to engage in any effort to assess defendants’ ability
to pay prior to ordering their incarceration, instead summarily
issuing arrest warrants for any “missed, partial, or untimely pay-
ment.”149 These warrants, therefore, are functionally equivalent to
the probation revocation orders for failure to pay that the Court has
struck down, because the failure to pay triggers the incarceration.150
The second type of warrant issued by the Ferguson courts was for
violation of a “Failure to Appear” ordinance, an independent offense
used in relation to hearings regarding previously assessed economic
sanctions.151 Courts certainly have the authority to enforce an order
to appear in court. But the system in Ferguson appeared designed
to force people to violate court orders in order to generate more
sanctions and therefore was arguably even more perverse than the
pay-or-stay statutes the Court has struck down.152 In fact, a mu-
nicipal judge in a neighboring town told the Department of Justice
that adding a failure to appear charge was seen throughout St.
Louis County not as a necessary tool for protecting the authority of
the court in issuing orders, but as a “cushion for judges against the
attack that the court is operating as a debtor’s prison.”153 
146. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 3.
147. See ARCHCITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 35.
148. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 55.
149. See id. at 53.
150. See id. at 57-58 (“While the court does not sentence a defendant to jail in such a case,
the result is often equivalent to what Bearden proscribes: the incarceration of a defendant
solely because of an inability to pay a fine.”); see also Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668-69
(1983).
151. See FERGUSON, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 13, art. III, § 13-58 (repealed 2014);
FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 55; see also Colin Reingold, Essay, Pretextual Sanctions,
Contempt, and the Practical Limitations of Bearden-Based Debtors’ Prison Litigation, 21
MICH. J. RACE & L. 361, 369-72 (2016) (describing use of failure to appear and contempt
charges in debtors’ prison systems). Failure to appear and contempt charges have gained favor
in many jurisdictions in recent years. Erin Murphy has documented the increasing use of such
charges as pretextual convictions where the state would otherwise be unable to obtain a
conviction on a separate substantive charge. See Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: Process,
Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1458-63 (2009).
152. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
153. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 56.
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First, the information provided to those owing economic sanctions
made it unlikely that they would appear for mandatory hearings.
Ferguson police often failed to properly complete tickets, at times
leaving out “critical information from the citation, which makes it
impossible for a person to determine ... whether a court appearance
is required.”154 This deficiency was exacerbated by the fact that the
municipal court ordered more in-person appearances than required
under Missouri state law.155 Further, through the municipal court’s
website, mailings, and records, Ferguson’s court staff routinely pro-
vided misinformation regarding court hearings.156 At times, court
began prior to the announced session time, and then court personnel
locked the doors five minutes after the session was to have begun,
effectively blocking people attempting to attend court from actually
doing so.157
Second, the behavior of the judge and court staff made it reason-
able for those with outstanding debt to avoid court for fear of arrest.
The court refused to accept partial payments,158 at times arresting
those who arrived without full payments on the spot.159 Judge
Brockmeyer also had a practice of holding in contempt—and incar-
cerating—those who attended court hearings but also attempted to
participate by asking questions about, or seeking relief from, un-
payable economic sanctions.160 
154. Id. at 45.
155. See id. at 44, 48.
156. See id. at 45-48; see also ARCHCITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 36. Once warrants
were issued, Ferguson’s clerks did not bother even sending notice in an effort to “save the cost
of warrant cards and postage.” FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 47 (quoting email from
court clerk to chief of police).
157. ARCHCITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 36. The court clerks also at times closed the
court’s payment window earlier than the posted hours, preventing people from paying on time.
See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 51.
158. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 4 (describing a woman who made two at-
tempts to make partial payments toward a parking ticket but was refused both times by the
court); id. at 42 (regarding court clerk’s refusal to take partial payment from a single mother).
Another egregious example of an arrest stemming from an attempt to comply with a court rule
was documented by the ArchCity Defenders: “Antonio Morgan reported being denied entry
to the court with his children and then being jailed for child endangerment after leaving them
in the court parking lot under the supervision of a friend.” ARCHCITY WHITE PAPER, supra
note 3, at 14; see also id. at 21-22.
159. See ARCHCITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 21.
160. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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At no point did the municipal court provide defendants a mean-
ingful opportunity to be heard regarding their inability to pay
economic sanctions prior to issuing an arrest warrant or during the
course of incarceration. Even when defendants attempted to argue
inability to pay, the municipal court declined to consider the
evidence. In one example, a woman reported her attempt to explain
to the judge that she was unable to pay the $1758 in economic
sanctions imposed for traffic violations, to which he responded that
she would have to remain in jail for two weeks, and said further:
“We’ll see how much money you can come up with.”161 Additionally,
prosecutors and court clerks were given the power to directly reject
arguments of inability to pay162—far from the meaningful assess-
ment at a judicial hearing contemplated by the Supreme Court. For
example, one Ferguson assistant court clerk emailed a rejection to
a defendant who had requested a reduced monthly payment plan,
simply stating, “everyone says [they] can’t pay.”163 
Even if Ferguson’s municipal courts had engaged in a meaningful
analysis of defendants’ ability to pay, Ferguson still failed to fulfill
the additional requirement that alternatives to incarceration be
considered. Take, for example, the potential alternatives offered by
the Supreme Court: reduction of fines, payment plans at rates low
enough that defendants are able to make payments, and commun-
ity service.164 Ferguson routinely refused to employ the first two
alternatives,165 and made community service available only in lim-
ited circumstances to teenagers and to adults who could pay a
program fee.166 So not only did the municipal court refuse to assess
161. Nicole Bolden, Debtors Prisons Are Illegal in America. Missouri Locked Me Up in One
Anyway, GUARDIAN (Feb. 12, 2015, 11:15 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2015/feb/12/debtors-prisons-illegal-america-ferguson-missouri-incarcerated [https://perma.cc/
8Y9U-ZEJU].
162. See supra notes 64-70.
163. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 53-54 (alteration in original) (quoting a Ferguson
municipal court assistant court clerk).
164. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671-72 (1983); see also Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395,
399-400 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244-45 (1970).
165. See supra notes 68-69, 163 and accompanying text.
166. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 3-4, 54; FERGUSON VIOLATIONS SCHEDULE,
supra note 58, at 2. Though community service was an option given by the Court as an
alternative to incarceration, it may not be a good policy choice. See, e.g., Noah Zatz, Get to
Work or Go to Jail: Free Labor in the Shadow of Mass Incarceration, ACSBLOG (Nov. 16, 2015),
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/get-to-work-or-go-to-jail-free-labor-in-the-shadow-of-mass-
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whether the person’s failure to pay was due to indigency, Ferguson
jailed people unable to pay without providing or even considering
meaningful alternatives beyond incarceration.
It is not immediately apparent, given the interests in revenue
generation, why Ferguson officials would use incarceration as a
collection method, given the costs inherent to housing and feeding
inmates,167 and because, as the Court has previously noted, when a
person has no money to pay, incarceration cannot magically make
the debtor flush.168 In Ferguson, however, the expense of running
the jail was limited—in fiscal year 2013, Ferguson spent less than
$200,000 on its jail, including approximately $175,000 on officer
salaries and a paltry $18,762 on other jail expenditures.169 Further,
Ferguson’s warrant process created additional opportunities to
impose economic sanctions, including a $50 fee to cancel a warrant,
$120 to $130 in fees for arriving late to court, and a fee of $30 to $60
per night spent in jail.170 Additionally, Ferguson did not need to
make the debtor herself suddenly flush; instead, it used incarcera-
tion as a mechanism for generating revenue not from the debtor, but
from the families and friends of those arrested who wished to save
their loved ones from languishing in jail.171 In Fant v. City of Fer-
guson, a lawsuit filed in February 2015 regarding Ferguson’s
incarceration [https://perma.cc/5RDP-N9JT].
167. See ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR
CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS
7 (2009) (“[T]axpayers expend on average $80 per inmate per day to lock up misdemeanants.”
(footnote omitted)).
168. See Tate, 401 U.S. at 399.
169. In fiscal year 2013, Ferguson staffed its jail with three correctional officers. See 2014-
15 BUDGET, supra note 56, at 70. Its budget, however, did not separate out those salaries from
other police department personnel. See id. at 71. In documents released in May 2016,
Ferguson estimated that it would save $200,000 in salaries by subcontracting out 3.5
correctional officer positions. See CITY OF FERGUSON, MO., ANNUAL OPERATING BUDGET:
FISCAL YEAR 2016-2017, at 5 (2016) [hereinafter 2016-17 BUDGET], https://www.fergusoncity.
com/documentcenter/view/1983 [https://perma.cc/255L-CPCM]. Based on those figures, I have
estimated the expenditures per full-time correctional officer in fiscal year 2013 at $58,000.
Further, in fiscal year 2013, Ferguson expended an additional $18,762 on the jail. See 2014-15
BUDGET, supra note 56, at 71.
170. See Julia Lurie & Katie Rose Quandt, How Many Ways Can the City of Ferguson Slap
You with Court Fees? We Counted, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 12, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.
motherjones.com/politics/2014/09/ferguson-might-have-break-its-habit-hitting-poor-people-big-
fines [https://perma.cc/K6V7-EYER].
171. See Class Action Complaint at 1, 5, Fant v. City of Ferguson, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1016
(E.D. Mo. 2015) (No. 4:15-cv-00253).
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municipal court, plaintiffs detailed jailers’ practice of informing
those arrested on warrants that they would be released immediately
if they could convince family and friends to pay a given amount,
with the negotiated amount decreasing as days wore on (and the
increasing cost of incarceration made holding the individual less
financially lucrative).172 The use of incarceration, in other words,
cost little, created an additional means of generating revenue for the
city, and provided an opportunity to obtain payments from an even
wider base of people. As a result, the warrants practices remained
a lucrative component of Ferguson’s system.
B. The Role of Individual Defense Counsel in System Reform in
the Aftermath of the Shooting of Michael Brown
As detailed above, prior to the shooting of Michael Brown,
Ferguson maintained a system rife with constitutional deficiencies,
focused on generating revenue for the municipality, and in which
the vast majority of defendants were unrepresented. While a limited
number of defendants had retained or pro bono counsel, the mu-
nicipal court judge or prosecutor routinely dismissed such cases,
thereby keeping the hourly rates of the private attorneys who
served as prosecutors low.173 Without counsel to litigate in the re-
maining cases, Ferguson also was able to limit court time to three
court sessions per month,174 despite processing between 13,000 and
25,000 cases per year.175 Of course, Ferguson experienced a loss of
revenue in the small fraction of cases dismissed after counsel
172. See id. at 5, 8-9. The allegations against Ferguson also suggest that the city expended
less than might be expected on jailing people. See, e.g., id. at 2. The Complaint describes
people incarcerated for the inability to pay being held under conditions in which, among other
things, they were denied access to personal hygiene items such as menstrual pads, forced to
drink water out of the tap attached to the toilet, and denied access to necessary medication.
See id.
173. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text; see also Stephen Deere, Legal Bills
Mount as Ferguson Stands by ‘Failure-to-Comply’ Cases, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May
2, 2016), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/legal-bills-mount-as-ferguson-
stands-by-failure-to-comply/article_2070be9f-99f1-5218-9e3a-cdfaf4dfed5e.html [https://
perma.cc/54M8-K7AA] [hereinafter Deere, Legal Bills].
174. See Ferguson Municipal Court, CITY OF FERGUSON, https://www.fergusoncity.com/60/
The-City-Of-Ferguson-Municipal-Courts [https://perma.cc/9RSJ-LHTF].
175. See 2014-15 BUDGET, supra note 56, at 116 (showing statistics for fiscal years 2007-
2013).
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appeared, but in the vast majority of cases prosecutors were able to
obtain convictions perfunctorily, with economic sanctions in tow. 
As a result, municipal expenditures ran low and revenues ran
high. In fiscal year 2013, for example, Ferguson expended $313,192
on its courts,176 and approximately $193,000 on its jail.177 On the
revenue side of the ledger, however, the court raised nearly 2.5
million dollars.178 The bottom line for the municipal court system
was just under 2 million dollars in net benefit.
At that time, the ArchCity Defenders’ work focused on legal
representation of people struggling with homelessness and housing
insecurity,179 through which its attorneys had begun to provide lim-
ited defense representation post-conviction in the context of seeking
to void warrants for its housing clients.180 It was not long, however,
before their attorneys understood that large scale abuses were
occurring. As Executive Director Thomas Harvey explained: 
I’ll be frank. There was no way we started believing we were get-
ting involved in some political fight, we were merely responding
to a gap in services. But as you start talking to the people you’re
representing and then you see the way the courts are treating
them, and then the visual of 300 African-American men lined up
with a white judge, white prosecutor, and white police and you
realize that this is more than a legal issue. It’s impossible to
think about this any other way when you’re actually out there.181
Disturbed by what they were witnessing, the ArchCity Defenders
reached out to the Southern Poverty Law Center, which provided
advice and a template on how to engage in a court-watching
program.182 The ArchCity Defenders then began court-watching in
Ferguson and neighboring cities, confirmed their suspicions, and
176. Id. at 69.
177. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
178. See 2014-15 BUDGET, supra note 56, at 52 (including both municipal court revenues
and the mandatory police training fee imposed for each nonmoving traffic violation).
179. See “St. Louis on the Air,” supra note 71, at 4:35 (interviewing ArchCity Defenders’
Executive Director Thomas Harvey shortly after the shooting of Michael Brown: “I’ve worked
with the homeless population primarily. That’s who ArchCity Defenders works with.”).
180. See Harvey Interview, supra note 1.
181. Id.
182. See “St. Louis on the Air,” supra note 71.
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publicly released their findings in a White Paper within days of
Michael Brown’s death.183 Harvey stated: 
Our white paper was an attempt to take seriously what our cli-
ents have been telling us since 2009.... Since the first day I ever
met a client who had a case in municipal court, they told me two
things, and that’s this isn’t about public safety, it’s about the
money; and I was pulled over because I was a member of a
community of color.184
After releasing the White Paper, the ArchCity Defenders then
joined with professors from St. Louis University School of Law to
request that the Supreme Court of Missouri amend its rules to
clarify that Missouri municipal courts were mandated under state
law to “proportion fines to the resources of offenders and ... to
respond in a constitutional manner to non-payment by indigent
defendants.”185
Coming in a period of relative calm in Ferguson,186 the public
reaction to the revelations in the White Paper and the call for
specific reforms was swift. On September 5, 2014, social justice
activists held the first of many protests calling for municipal court
reform, this one outside of Ferguson’s city hall.187 Three days later,
in advance of a scheduled city council meeting, Ferguson officials
announced they would respond to the activists’ demands by pro-
viding a one-month window for those with outstanding warrants to
have the warrants quashed, voting on a cap on the percentage of city
revenue that could be generated from economic sanctions, and
183. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
184. Smith, supra note 1 (quoting Thomas Harvey, ArchCity Defenders’ Executive
Director).
185. Letter from Brendan Roediger et al., Clinical Law Offices, St. Louis Univ. Sch. of Law,
to Bill Thompson, Clerk, Supreme Court of Mo. (Sept. 3, 2014), https://assets.documentcloud.
org/documents/1506908/slu-law-letter-asking-for-scomo-change.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FHW-
XV2Y].
186. See Sabrina Siddiqui & Simon McCormack, Here’s a Timeline of the Events in Fer-
guson Since Michael Brown’s Death, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 25, 2014, 3:30 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/25/ferguson-timeline_n_6220166.html [https://perma.cc/C7BN-
AH5S].
187. See Jennifer S. Mann, Cries for Reform in Traffic Courts Grow Louder in Wake of
Ferguson, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-
and-courts/cries-for-reform-in-traffic-courts-grow-louder-in-wake/article_0295f598-7421-515a-
8c52-337a36b7cc71.html [https://perma.cc/C328-QGDE].
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considering the repeal of the city’s 50 dollar warrant revocation fee
as well as a failure to appear ordinance that was a source of sig-
nificant funding for the municipality.188 City council member Mark
Byrne explained the early announcement by stating that the city
council wanted “to demonstrate to residents that we take their
concerns extremely seriously.”189 Later that month, the city council
took action, voting to eliminate several fees related to its warrants
practice and the failure to appear ordinance.190
Public pressure also led municipal judges in the region to form
the St. Louis County Municipal Court Improvement Committee
made up of municipal judges, prosecutors, and court staff.191 As
committee member Frank Vatterott, a municipal court judge in the
region for over thirty-five years, remarked, “If there’s any good out
of this tragedy, it’s that it gives us the impetus to fix our own
abuses.”192 In addition to considering proposing an amnesty program
for outstanding economic sanctions and alternatives to such sanc-
tions moving forward, the committee also announced that it was
interested in developing a program in which volunteer attorneys
would provide municipal court representation pro bono.193 That pro-
posal met with resistance from the ArchCity Defenders and Better
Together, an organization favoring consolidation of municipalities
in the region, both of whom preferred a full public defender system
funded by the region’s municipalities.194 In a report released in Oc-
tober 2014, Better Together called the plan to provide pro bono at-
torneys “unsustainable and impractical,” and argued that requiring
188. Jennifer S. Mann, Judges Propose Wide Reform of St. Louis County’s Municipal
Courts, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-
and-courts/judges-propose-wide-reform-of-st-louis-county-s-municipal/article_02b3b9e9-7666-
54dd-ad90-37441af32176.html [https://perma.cc/WR94-Q2CA]; Frances Robles, Ferguson Sets
Broad Change for City Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/
us/ferguson-council-looks-to-improve-community-relations-with-police.html [https://perma.cc/
A9CJ-3T9T].
189. Robles, supra note 188.
190. See FERGUSON VIOLATIONS SCHEDULE, supra note 58, at 1.
191. See Mann, supra note 188.
192. Id. (quoting Frank Vatterott, a private attorney and municipal judge).
193. See id.; see also Smith, supra note 1.
194. See BETTER TOGETHER, MUNICIPAL COURTS, supra note 74, at 4, 15-16; William
Freivogel, Two Visions of Municipal Court Reform, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Nov. 12, 2014),
http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/two-visions-municipal-court-reform [https://perma.cc/3GTJ-
P7RV].
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municipalities to pay for public defense was justified in light of the
revenue generated by municipal courts, would better ensure that
individual rights were protected, and would “demonstrate[ ] to citi-
zens that their rights are important and that the court does not
exist simply to bring in revenue.”195 When Judge Vatterott renewed
his call for a pro bono system of representation at a November 2014
public debate, ArchCity Defenders’ Harvey argued, “I believe these
courts should bear the costs of running the courts and part of those
costs are legal defense of indigents before them.”196 In the following
months, the Municipal Court Improvement Committee would simul-
taneously renew its proposal for the installation of a pro bono
representation system and suggest the imposition of additional fees
in the municipal court in relation to the program.197
At the November 2014 debate, Harvey also questioned the ability
of a committee made up of municipal court officials to oversee re-
forms after Judge Vatterott questioned whether the municipal
courts should or even could hold ability to pay hearings.198 To avoid
what he called the “fox guarding the henhouse,” Harvey suggested
that the Municipal Court Improvement Committee be expanded to
include members of Missourians Organizing for Reform and Em-
powerment (MORE), a grassroots organization whose members had
demonstrated in favor of municipal court reforms.199 Judge Vatterott
rejected the idea,200 later explaining in an interview his belief that
“[o]ur judges and our court personnel are the road warriors. We
know best how to improve our courts.”201
Unsatisfied, the ArchCity Defenders joined with the St. Louis
University Criminal Defense Clinic and an additional nonprofit,
Equal Justice Under the Law, to file class action lawsuits in Fer-
195. BETTER TOGETHER, MUNICIPAL COURTS, supra note 74, at 15-16.
196. Freivogel, supra note 194.
197. See Jeremy Kohler & Jennifer S. Mann, Municipal Court Reforms Gaining Mo-
mentum, but How Far Will They Go?, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.
stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/municipal-court-reforms-gaining-momentum-but-
how-far-will-they/article_1b7ba83d-4363-5fd1-a119-99a293f91407.html [https://perma.cc/
NRW4-9BGL].
198. See Freivogel, supra note 194.
199. See id.; see also “St. Louis on the Air,” supra note 71, at 26:36 (Harvey: “There’s got
to be some members of the community on that committee though. You’ve got to have some
directly impacted people if you want to get to real solutions that are [going] to help them.”).
200. See Freivogel, supra note 194.
201. Kohler & Mann, supra note 197.
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guson and other Missouri municipalities that challenged municipal
court practices.202 They also began to see some success from earlier
advocacy efforts, as the Missouri Supreme Court amended its rules
to clarify that municipal courts must accept payments in install-
ments.203 MORE and other social justice advocates also continued to
demonstrate and publicly call for municipal court reforms. In
February, for example, MORE released a list of demands for
reform—including the consolidation of the region’s municipal courts,
elimination of the use of incarceration as a punishment for inability
to pay, and abolishment of failure to appear ordinances.204 MORE
also called for a system in which economic sanctions would be
proportioned to income and alternative sanctions made available,
and in which public defenders would be provided to all indigent
defendants.205
Then, on March 4, the Department of Justice released a report
documenting its investigation in Ferguson.206 When the Department
announced shortly after the death of Michael Brown that it would
investigate Ferguson’s police department, its focus was on the task
of determining if there was a pattern and practice of constitutional
violations related to use of force, stops, searches, and arrests, or in
Ferguson’s jail.207 In the months that would follow, the Department
reviewed the ArchCity Defenders White Paper and the Better
202. See Jeremy Kohler, Lawyers Sue 7 St. Louis County Municipalities Over Court Fees,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-
courts/lawyers-sue-st-louis-county-municipalities-over-court-fees/article_dd6025d9-fcbd-536b-
8d8c-97d0acf144ef.html [https://perma.cc/66TH-7ASC]; see also Class Action Complaint, supra
note 171. Subsequent to the initial filing, the nonprofit Civil Rights Corp. and the law firm
of White & Case, LLP, joined as co-counsel. See E-mail from Thomas B. Harvey, Dir., Arch-
City Defenders, to Beth A. Colgan (Nov. 30, 2016) (on file with author).
203. See Jeremy Kohler, Missouri Supreme Court Sets Rules for Muni Court Fines, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/
missouri-supreme-court-sets-rules-for-muni-court-fines/article_5de25408-196b-5698-90cf-
c716326344e6.html [https://perma.cc/6F5Q-CGXU].
204. See MISSOURIANS ORGANIZING FOR REFORM AND EMPOWERMENT, TRANSFORMING ST.
LOUIS COUNTY’S RACIST MUNICIPAL COURTS 2-4 (2015) [hereinafter MORE REPORT].
205. See id.
206. See generally FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9.
207. See Kimberly Kindy & Sari Horwitz, Holder Announces Ferguson Probe, Review of St.
Louis County Police Practices, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/holder-announces-ferguson-probe-review-of-st-louis-county-police-practices/
2014/09/04/1cae963c-3452-11e4-8f02-03c644b2d7d0_story.html [https://perma.cc/5YF7-2TFB]
(including a video of then-Attorney General Eric Holder’s announcement of the investigation).
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Together Report, observed the municipal court at work, and inter-
viewed Ferguson residents subjected to the municipal court
system.208 Ultimately, the Department’s Report addressed both Fer-
guson’s policing and its municipal court practices and confirmed
what advocates in Missouri had claimed: Ferguson’s municipal court
system operated as a revenue-generating mechanism for the city to
the detriment of the region’s poor and primarily black residents.209
The Department’s Report detailed how black people were sub-
jected to 85 percent of all vehicle stops in Ferguson despite its
population being only 67 percent black.210 Though the failure of
police to track the unconstitutional practice of “ped checks,” de-
scribed above,211 means statistics on such stops are not available,
anecdotal evidence suggests that police used ped checks almost
exclusively against black youth.212 Once stopped, police were more
likely to search black people—despite the fact that white people
were 26 percent more likely to have contraband when searched—as
well as to cite and arrest black people.213 Ferguson police also
charged certain ordinance violations almost exclusively against
black people, including manner of walking in roadway (95 percent
of all charges), peace disturbances (92 percent of all charges), and
failure to comply (94 percent of all charges).214
The harm caused by the municipal court’s practices was also
racially disproportionate. Of arrest warrants issued by the court, 92
percent were against black people, leading to circumstances where,
of arrests based only on an outstanding municipal warrant, 96 per-
cent of arrestees were black.215 The municipal court was also nearly
70 percent less likely to dismiss charges against black people,216
required black defendants to attend more hearings than white
defendants,217 and assessed higher fines against black people than
208. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 1 (describing its investigation as including
review of “third-party studies regarding municipal court practices”).
209. See id. at 2; see also, e.g., ARCHCITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 2, 34-36; BETTER
TOGETHER, MUNICIPAL COURTS, supra note 74, at 2; MORE REPORT, supra note 204, at 1.
210. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 62.
211. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
212. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 67.
213. See id. at 62.
214. Id.
215. See id. at 62-63.
216. See id. at 62.
217. See id. at 68.
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white people for the same offenses.218 Because policing, the use of
arrest warrants, extending hearings to make failure to appear fines
more likely, and assessment of economic sanctions were essential to
Ferguson’s system of generating revenue, these racial disparities
meant that Ferguson’s black community members overwhelmingly
shouldered the burden of that system.
The Department’s investigation also makes clear that these
disparities were “driven, at least in part, by intentional discrimina-
tion.”219 The Department gathered testimony from community
members regarding police misconduct against black people involving
use or threats of force.220 Other community members reported police
use of racial epithets during interactions with the community.221 The
Department also uncovered emails among law enforcement, court
staff, and their supervisors exhibiting racial and ethnic bias.222
Though initially favoring voluntary changes to municipal court
practices,223 following the release of the Department of Justice’s Re-
port, the Missouri Supreme Court quickly stepped in and installed
a Missouri Court of Appeals judge to oversee Ferguson’s municipal
court.224 Immune from the pressure of Ferguson officials to generate
revenue, he began by significantly reducing traffic fines, some by
over half.225 Under pressure due to the Department of Justice’s
Report and the pending class action lawsuit, at the instigation of the
Municipal Court Improvement Committee, Ferguson officials also
agreed to establish uniform fines along with numerous other
municipalities at lower rates than previously imposed.226
218. See id. at 69.
219. Id. at 63.
220. See id. at 39.
221. Id. at 73.
222. Id. at 71-73.
223. Cf. Kohler & Mann, supra note 197.
224. See Stephen Deere & Walker Moskop, New Judge Takes Over in Ferguson, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/new-
judge-takes-over-in-ferguson/article_9a67b853-3b24-548f-8f5d-dfad6aa00d56.html
[https://perma.cc/U5YV-YH29].
225. See id.
226. See Rachel Lippmann, 80 Municipal Courts in St. Louis County Agree to Uniform
Fines for Ordinance Violations, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Apr. 9, 2015), http://news.stlpublic
radio.org/post/80-municipal-courts-st-louis-county-agree-uniform-fines-ordinance-violations
[https://perma.cc/5JLU-9QGC]; see also FERGUSON VIOLATIONS SCHEDULE, supra note 58, at
1 (detailing Ferguson’s adoption of a uniform fine schedule).
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Upon releasing its Report, the Department of Justice began
engaging in negotiations with Ferguson’s city council under threat
of a federal lawsuit.227 After coming to an agreement, the city council
balked and the Department called its bluff by filing suit.228 In
response, Ferguson’s city council quickly shifted course again,
unanimously approving a consent decree in March 2016.229 In doing
so, the council agreed to extensive changes to the city’s policing
practices and additional requirements for reforming its municipal
court system, including an amnesty program for past fines and fees,
the elimination of hurdles to payment of court debts, and limitations
on the use of arrest warrants.230
At the same time the Department was negotiating with Fer-
guson’s city council, the ArchCity Defenders and the St. Louis
University Criminal Defense Clinic were also upping the ante by
actively litigating several individual cases charged in Ferguson.231
For example, Ferguson’s prosecutor, Stephanie Karr, chose to pro-
secute a set of failure to comply cases charged against Ferguson
protestors.232 In addition to pursuing a civil challenge raising a
constitutional claim that Ferguson’s failure to comply ordinance is
impermissibly vague given that it captured activities protected by
the First Amendment,233 the attorneys also tackled serious evi-
227. See Matt Apuzzo, Department of Justice Sues Ferguson, Which Reversed Course on
Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/11/us/politics/justice-
department-sues-ferguson-over-police-deal.html [https://perma.cc/MA5H-QNGP].
228. See id.
229. See John Eligon, Ferguson Approves a Federal Plan to Overhaul Police and Courts,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/16/us/ferguson-approves-a-
federal-plan-to-overhaul-police-and-courts.html [https://perma.cc/FP9Q-EMAZ]. For a detailed
assessment of how structural reform litigation pursued by the Department of Justice can force
political change, see generally Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American
Police Departments, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1343 (2015).
230. See Consent Decree at 1, 11-12, 78-89, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-
000180 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 19, 2016).
231. See Stephen Deere, Judge Hands Down Two More Not-Guilty Verdicts in Cases
Stemming from Ferguson Protests, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 17, 2016), http://www.
stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/judge-hands-down-two-more-not-guilty-verdicts-in-
cases/article_4b0813a7-3d16-50b5-b789-398f004dd370.html [https://perma.cc/T4GX-VBXC]
[hereinafter Deere, Two More]; Deere, Legal Bills, supra note 173.
232. See Deere, Two More, supra note 231; Deere, Legal Bills, supra note 173.
233. See Jeremy Kohler, Lawsuit Challenges St. Louis County’s Go-To Charge for
Protesters, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 29, 2016), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/
crime-and-courts/lawsuit-challenges-st-louis-county-s-go-to-charge-for/article_0b3dfd3c-68b0-
5f17-b172-8870c604887e.html [https://perma.cc/56KQ-Z32Z].
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dentiary problems in several pending cases.234 In one case, the
defendant had questioned an officer’s authority to demand his
identification, handed his identification over after he was threat-
ened with arrest, and then was arrested for failure to comply.235
Other cases had significant evidentiary problems, including, in one
case, that the prosecution had been unable even to identify the key
witness to the charge: the arresting officer.236 
While for years such crucial deficiencies resulted in convictions
for people left without representation in Ferguson’s municipal
courts, in these cases the defendants were provided individual
defense representation by the ArchCity Defenders, students in the
St. Louis University Criminal Defense Clinic, and other pro bono
attorneys.237 Defense counsel sought removal of the cases to the
associate circuit court, where they litigated various evidentiary and
constitutional claims.238 
The increase in litigation in Ferguson caused the costs of pros-
ecution to tick steadily upward, from $30,260 billed in 2014 to
$61,705 in 2015, with prosecutors on pace to bill $120,000 in 2016.239
This is well beyond what the municipality budgeted for such ex-
penses.240 And, in general, those expenses were for naught. In light
of the prosecution’s inability to prove the elements of the crime
charged, the associate circuit court judge dismissed five of the
cases.241 The prosecution finally dropped a sixth case less than an
hour before it was to go to trial.242 In fact, Ferguson prosecutors
have lost 40 percent of trials in the associate circuit court,243 mean-
ing that as its bills have skyrocketed, the city is simultaneously
gaining less and less revenue.
234. See Deere, Legal Bills, supra note 173.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See id.; see also Deere, Two More, supra note 231.
238. See Deere, Legal Bills, supra note 173.
239. Id.
240. See 2016-17 BUDGET, supra note 169, at 98.
241. See Deere, Two More, supra note 231.
242. See Stephen Deere, Ferguson Prosecutor Dismisses Case Minutes Before Trial, Main-
tains that the Defendant Still Violated the Law, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 18, 2016),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/ferguson-prosecutor-dismisses-case-minutes-before-trial-
maintains-that-the/article_65946f32-62e3-5251-b22b-31bd6b0a8f58.html [https://perma.cc/
Y9MH-HPX9] [hereinafter Deere, Ferguson Prosecutor].
243. See Deere, Legal Bills, supra note 173.
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That loss in revenue combined with losses stemming from the
changes in the ordinance code and fee schedule noted above had a
significant effect on Ferguson’s bottom line. The failure to appear
charge alone had previously accounted for 24 percent of municipal
court revenues.244 Overall, Ferguson’s gross municipal court reve-
nues dropped from 2.5 million dollars in 2013,245 to approximately
1.05 million dollars in 2015,246 and continued to drop to just under
$579,000 in 2016.247
In addition to fiscal pressure, the act of litigating the failure to
comply and several other cases also forced the city of Ferguson to
stake out a position regarding its manner of policing and system of
justice. For example, in at least one case the prosecution argued
that, in Ferguson, guilt can and should be inferred from the mere
fact of arrest.248 In addition to being legally unsound, public report-
ing of these statements was fuel on the fire for social justice
activists who called for the removal of the prosecutor.249
The combined public pressure from individual defense counsel,
social justice activists, and the Department of Justice ultimately
changed the makeup of those with power in Ferguson. Recall that
the use of the municipal court as a revenue-generating mechanism
was overseen by Ferguson’s municipal judge, city manager, police
chief, and city prosecutor.250 When the Missouri Supreme Court
244. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 43; see also id. at 3, 42.
245. See 2014-15 BUDGET, supra note 56, at 50; see also supra notes 176-78 and accom-
panying text.
246. See 2016-17 BUDGET, supra note 169, at 16.
247. Jeremy Kohler, Municipal Court Business Is Way Down After Ferguson Unrest, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 5, 2017), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/
municipal-court-business-is-way-down-after-ferguson-unrest/article_6c541acb-a28d-524b-
ba83-c0238af72ce7.html [https://perma.cc/DJE7-KF97].
248. See Deere, Legal Bills, supra note 173.
249. See, e.g., Stephen Deere & Christine Byers, Ferguson City Attorney, Target of Pro-
testors in Recent Months, Resigns Position, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 24, 2016),
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/ferguson-city-attorney-target-of-
protesters-in-recent-months-resigns/article_1ec4967a-58ec-5956-be60-8931a1a9c6b9.html
[https://perma.cc/34NX-5KN5] (describing protestors carrying signs reading “Stop the Karr-
uption”); Stephen Deere, Ferguson Loses Three More Cases Against Protestors, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (May 12, 2016), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/ferguson-
loses-three-more-cases-against-protesters/article_3393e5d9-1857-5358-991f-e0c67123f220.
html [https://perma.cc/9BUN-22FV] [hereinafter Deere, Ferguson Loses] (describing a protest
beginning in front of the municipal court and ending at Karr’s home).
250. See supra Part I.A.1.
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installed a circuit court judge to oversee Ferguson’s municipal court,
Judge Brockmeyer resigned.251 A few days later both the city man-
ager252 and the police chief253 stepped down. The following month,
after unusually high voter turnout driven by a desire for policing
and court reform, three new city council members were elected254
with reform at the top of the agenda and a commitment to bring in
a new police chief who would support such efforts.255 The city council
ultimately selected as chief of police Delrish Moss, a veteran
African-American officer from Florida who had become a police
officer after being racially harassed by the police as a youth.256 Chief
Moss promised to “clean house” by firing or seeking the prosecution
of errant officers,257 and to put resources toward community
policing.258
The last holdout was Stephanie Karr, Ferguson’s prosecutor.259
Karr doubled down on the old system, attempting to block the city
council’s approval of the consent decree negotiated with the
251. See Jeremy Kohler, Brockmeyer Resigns as Prosecuting Attorney in Florissant and
Vinita Park, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/
crime-and-courts/brockmeyer-resigns-as-prosecuting-attorney-in-florissant-and-vinita-
park/article_5272300e-022a-5970-aaff-d71758c23c56.html [https://perma.cc/W34P-A84X]. A
few days later, Brockmeyer also resigned as the prosecuting attorney in three other neigh-
boring communities. See id.
252. See Dana Ford, Ferguson City Manager Resigns After Critical DOJ Report, CNN (Mar.
11, 2015, 1:24 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/10/us/ferguson-city-manager/ [https://perma.
cc/YQ87-YJBA].
253. See Matt Pearce, Ferguson Police Chief Steps Down; Official Calls It ‘Long Overdue,’
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015, 6:57 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ferguson-police-
chief-20150311-story.html [https://perma.cc/D9UY-D6BS].
254. See Moni Basu, Ferguson Election Makes History, Adds More Blacks to City Council,
CNN (Apr. 8, 2015, 4:15 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/08/us/ferguson-election/ [https://
perma.cc/HCM5-BGRH].
255. See Dan Greenwald, New Ferguson City Council Members Sworn In; Reform Promised,
KMOV (Apr. 21, 2015, 11:01 PM), http://www.kmov.com/story/28864514/new-ferguson-city-
council-members-sworn-in-reform-promised [https://perma.cc/NRX4-NLX2].
256. See Lauren Victoria Burke, Delrish Moss Becomes First Black Police Chief in Ferguson,
NBC NEWS (May 10, 2016, 7:32 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/delrish-moss-
becomes-first-black-police-chief-ferguson-n570756 [https://perma.cc/3WW8-X65Y]; Jeff Pegues,
New Ferguson Police Chief: “I Expect to Clean House,” CBS NEWS (May 11, 2016, 6:49 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/new-ferguson-police-chief-delrish-moss-i-expect-to-clean-house/
[https://perma.cc/45HS-HQS8].
257. See Pegues, supra note 256.
258. See Burke, supra note 256.
259. See Deere & Byers, supra note 249.
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Department of Justice,260 and, as detailed above, continued aggres-
sive prosecution of cases despite significant legal problems.261 The
city council announced that, while it would leave Karr as the city
attorney, it would seek new counsel to serve the prosecutorial
function because of the potential conflict created by having a single
individual serving both roles.262 After the losses in trying to shape
the city council and in court, and with social justice activists
demonstrating against her continued presence in Ferguson’s system,
Karr resigned on May 24, 2016.263 Thus the quartet of city officials
in place when the ArchCity Defenders released their White Paper
documenting the pattern of abuses they saw when representing
individual clients no longer hold power in Ferguson.
While there is still significant room for reform in Ferguson and
activists there continue to work for change,264 it is also beyond
dispute that reform efforts there have had positive effects at both
the individual and systemic level. As Keith Rose, one of the
protestors prosecuted for failure to comply, remarked, “Without pro-
bono representation, I would have been forced to plead guilty to a
crime I didn’t commit.”265 Systemically, there also is significant
evidence of change. Though racial disparities in traffic stops persist,
both traffic and nontraffic offenses have dropped precipitously, by
85 and 88 percent respectively.266 Further, with prosecutor bills
260. See id.; Editorial Board, Ferguson’s Stubborn Stephanie Karr Faces Reality, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH (May 24, 2016), http://www.stltoday.com/news/opinion/columns/the-platform/
editorial-ferguson-s-stubborn-stephanie-karr-faces-reality/article_c351a9e1-9170-5a79-8156-
bb93a26a8356.html [https://perma.cc/PYQ9-FZA6] (describing Karr’s issuance of a legal opin-
ion to attempt to block the swearing in of a new council member who promised to approve the
consent decree).
261. See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
262. See Deere, Two More, supra note 231.
263. See Ferguson City Attorney to Resign, Commends Leaders’ ‘Grace’ After Michael
Brown’s Death, L.A. TIMES (May 24, 2016, 3:52 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nation
now/la-na-ferguson-city-attorney-20160524-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/ A5RM-92VM].
264. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Mann & Jeremy Kohler, Activsts Urge Consolidation of Area
Municipal Courts at St. Louis Hearing, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.
stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/activists-urge-consolidation-of-area-municipal-
courts-at-st-louis/article_498c0c55-1fa9-5e8e-ace2-c0cae41b68c9.html [https://perma.cc/YHU7-
EJCC]; Messenger, supra note 75 (describing man still fighting charges four years after his
arrest).
265. Deere, Ferguson Loses, supra note 249.
266. See Kohler, supra note 247; see also Durrie Bouscaren, Revisiting Ferguson: 2 Years
After the Shooting of Michael Brown, NPR (Aug. 9, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/
08/09/489158667/revisiting-ferguson-2-years-after-the-shooting-of-michael-brown
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skyrocketing, losses in court piling up, and fewer convictions
bringing in revenue,267 and in light of the costs of implementing the
Department of Justice consent decree and the potential of paying
millions in damages to resolve the pending civil rights litigation,268
the political conversation in Ferguson shifted. One city council
member has suggested that the council should consider restricting
prosecutor fees,269 and the city council is beginning to discuss
refocusing revenue generation on taxes,270 ultimately putting the
issue to a city-wide vote.271 Although voters declined to increase
property taxes, they approved increases to city sales, utility, and
business taxes, which are anticipated to generate nearly two million
dollars in revenue per year.272 Political pressure has also created an
interest among Ferguson’s newly elected officials to ensure that its
municipal court operates independent of the city’s financial
interests. In addition to the decision to separate out the city
attorney and city prosecutor functions, the new city manager has
expressed a belief that he should have no control over cases brought
in the municipal court system.273 The losses have also led the city
manager to question the types of cases prosecuted in its court,274 and
[https://perma.cc/MEZ6-XPAK].
267. See supra notes 239-47 and accompanying text.
268. The ArchCity Defenders, St. Louis University Criminal Defense Clinic, and Equal
Justice Under the Law filed a nearly identical suit to the one filed in Ferguson against the
neighboring municipality of Jennings. See generally Class Action Complaint, Jenkins v. City
of Jennings, No. 4:15-cv-00252 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015). To avoid litigation, Jennings officials
agreed to a multimillion dollar settlement of the claims. See Spencer S. Hsu, Town Near
Ferguson, Mo., Agrees to Pay $4.7 Million to Settle ‘Debtors Prison’ Case, WASH. POST (July
14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/town-near-ferguson-mo-agrees-
to-pay-47-million-to-settle-debtors-prison-case/2016/07/14/37b42078-49db-11e6-acbc-
4d4870a079da_story.html [https://perma.cc/4TD8-Y4K6].
269. See Deere, Two More, supra note 231.
270. See Deere, Legal Bills, supra note 173.
271. See Tim Bryant, Ferguson Proposes Tax Hike to Cover Costs of Revamping Police and
Court, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 22, 2016), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-
politics/ferguson-proposes-tax-hike-to-cover-costs-of-revamping-police/article_8113340e-b340-
5567-975e-599a8536334f.html [https://perma.cc/NA3Q-W8ST].
272. See Voters in Ferguson, Missouri, Approve 2nd Tax Increase, WASH. POST (Aug. 3,
2016), https://perma.cc/F9YT-D8M2; Joe Harris, Failure of Ferguson Tax Hike Won’t Affect
Deal, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Apr. 6, 2016, 2:39 PM), http://www.courthousenews.com/
2016/04/06/failure-of-ferguson-tax-hike-wont-affect-deal.htm [https:// perma.cc/WVP5-QRSJ].
273. See Deere, Ferguson Prosecutor, supra note 242.
274. See id. (quoting City Manager De’Carlon Seewood as saying, “It makes you ask the
question: ‘What’s going on?’”).
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caused the city council to eliminate the independent offense of
failure to appear as well as certain administrative fees.275 These are
all signals that further reform of the breadth and severity of
Ferguson’s municipal code is possible.276
While those changes are not solely due to individual defense
counsel, but rather are the result of the combined efforts of counsel,
civil rights litigators, the Department of Justice, and social justice
activists, it is noteworthy that traditional indigent defense represen-
tation in even a small number of cases charged in Ferguson contrib-
uted to systemic reform. Further, it was individual defense counsel
spotting and making public the pattern of abuses in Ferguson’s mu-
nicipal court that played a key role in bringing the need for change
to the fore. 
Yet despite the role even limited access to individual defense
counsel played in the reform effort, one key reform that has
remained out of reach is system-wide access to individual defense
representation in Ferguson’s municipal courts. Despite requiring
other meaningful changes, the Department of Justice’s consent
decree included only a general statement that Ferguson’s trial
procedures must comply “with all applicable constitutional and
other legal requirements,”277 and a mandate that Ferguson include
information on its website “regarding cost-free legal assistance that
may be available to individuals with pending municipal charges.”278
Other calls for the creation of a public defender system—by the
ArchCity Defenders,279 MORE,280 and Better Together281—have been
ignored. So too has the recommendation to establish such a system
by the Ferguson Commission, which was established by Missouri
Governor Jay Nixon two months after Michael Brown’s shooting
with the direction to investigate practices in Missouri’s municipal
275. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text. 
276. See Roberts, supra note 27, at 1099-100 (arguing that litigating misdemeanor offenses
would increase system costs and “give legislators a concrete reason (and perhaps some
political coverage) to decriminalize and to refrain from creating more minor criminal
offenses”).
277. Consent Decree, supra note 230, at 87.
278. Id. at 80.
279. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
280. See MORE REPORT, supra note 204, at 3.
281. See BETTER TOGETHER, MUNICIPAL COURTS, supra note 74, at 4, 15-16.
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courts.282 After nearly a year of investigation and community
meetings, the Ferguson Commission released a report in which it
described access to individual defense representation as a “signa-
ture priority.”283 And while Ferguson’s website now states that
individuals in its municipal court have a right “[t]o be represented
by an attorney,”284 as of the date of publication of this Article there
is no system in place for providing access to counsel.
II. THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM
As detailed above, Ferguson is illustrative of how a system ground-
ed on constitutional deficiencies can be used as a tool for revenue
generation, and how individual defense counsel can help to reform
such systems of governance. I turn now to what the experience in
Ferguson may teach regarding the role of individual defense counsel
for criminal justice reform efforts beyond that city’s borders.
Ferguson supports the conclusion that defense counsel can help
instigate criminal justice reform by shifting the cost-benefit of crime
policies, by helping to create a public reckoning regarding such po-
lices,285 and by achieving both through traditional indigent defense
282. See Jason Rosenbaum, Nixon Forms ‘Ferguson Commission’ to Examine Divisions
Throughout the Region, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Oct. 21, 2014), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/
post/nixon-forms-ferguson-commission-examine-divisions-throughout-region [https://perma.
cc/W6PW-HZ7E].
283. See FERGUSON COMM’N, FORWARD THROUGH FERGUSON: A PATH TOWARD RACIAL
EQUITY 33 (2015).
284. Rights and Responsibilities, CITY OF FERGUSON, https://www.fergusoncity.com/542/
Rights-and-Responsibilities [https://perma.cc/MRU3-N4E3].
285. Outside of the criminal arena, public law litigation scholars have long recognized the
ability of counsel, particularly those litigating class actions, to effect systemic change. See,
e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1302, 1310 (1976); see also Ben Depoorter, Essay, The Upside of Losing, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
817, 828 (2013); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 25 (1979); Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L.
REV. 477, 546 (2004); Carol M. Rose, Coming to Terms with Terminology: Evaluating Law
Reform, 31 STAN. L. REV. 977, 977-78 (1979) (reviewing JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1978)). In public law litigation scholarship, however, the work of
defense counsel is often cast as uniquely individualized and, with the possible exception of ap-
pellate representation, uniquely apolitical. See, e.g., STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT,
SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING 83 (2004)
(noting that, with the possible exception of appellate litigation, “public defender work is
strictly about law” and “is much less political and largely cut off from social movements with
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representation as well as through collaboration with federal and pro
bono civil rights litigators and social justice activists. I conclude this
Part by discussing the limitations of using Ferguson to understand
the role of indigent defense representation as a means of systemic
change—the inability to precisely compute fiscal or public pressure,
and distinctions stemming from the attention of a wide range of
advocates in Ferguson instigated by Michael Brown’s shooting—and
argue that because indigent defense representation can create fiscal
and public pressure for reform, access to counsel is especially
needed in places where injustices are occurring outside of Fergu-
son’s spotlight.
A. How Individual Representation Can Aid in Changing the Cost-
Benefit of Crime Policy
The experience in Ferguson supports the conclusion that advocacy
by individual defense counsel can create political pressure by
shifting the cost-benefit of crime policy decisions. This contention
relates to an ongoing debate in the literature regarding the extent
to which damage awards in constitutional tort litigation can create
political pressure and force changes in governance.286 Some com-
mentators posit that civil damages serve as a deterrent to continued
malfeasance, thereby pushing officials to engage in reforms to
reduce the likelihood of future litigation.287 Other commentators ar-
gue that even if damages are deterrent, because officials weigh
those fiscal risks against other and perhaps competing interests, the
actual effect on governance is too complicated to predict.288 This case
study of Ferguson does not resolve that debate, but it provides key
evidence of the deterrent effect of changing the cost-benefit of crime
political agendas”); Stuart Scheingold & Anne Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering:
Practice Sites and the Politicization of the Professional, 5 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 209, 232 (1998)
(describing criminal appellate representation as “impact litigation” in contrast to trial
representation). The effects of work performed by individual defense attorneys in Ferguson,
however, show that even trial-level defense representation has the capacity to create systemic
change just like other forms of public law litigation.
286. See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police
Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1151-56 (2016) (describing positions taken by various
commentators regarding the effect of civil suits seeking damages in deterring improper
governmental conduct).
287. See id. at 1151-52.
288. See id. at 1152-53.
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policy decisions even in situations in which revenue generation is
not the sole motivating factor. In Ferguson, access to even limited
defense representation shifted the cost-benefit balance of Ferguson’s
practices in two ways: through work by counsel in providing
traditional indigent defense representation,289 and by counsel’s
advocacy outside of that traditional role.290 Both forms of advocacy
can be tied directly to changes in Ferguson’s budget and to reforms
to its municipal court system.
First, once counsel began providing traditional indigent defense
representation by litigating individual cases—even in just a handful
of the cases charged in Ferguson—the costs of maintaining its
municipal court system began to rise.291 If defense representation
was available system-wide, those expenditures would skyrocket
even further. Litigation of issues ripe in Ferguson’s system would
necessitate an expansion of hearings at each stage: adjudicatory,
sentencing, and collections.292 At the adjudicatory stage, counsel
could bring claims seeking the exclusion of evidence stemming from
Fourth Amendment violations related to police practices of stopping
people without probable cause or reasonable suspicion and seek
hearings related to the failure of the police and prosecution to
establish all elements of the offense.293 In addition, challenges
resulting in striking down a statute for criminalizing constitution-
ally protected behavior or being unconstitutionally vague294 require
hearings in order to force a stop to the use of such ordinances.
Likewise, as-applied constitutional challenges—such as those that
would stem from the police practice of issuing unlawful orders to
stop and then arresting those who do not comply295—would result in
additional hearings and related expenditures. Of course, Ferguson
prosecutors and the municipal court could continue to simply dis-
miss or reduce charges to avoid these costs, as they have routinely
289. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 239-47 and accompanying text.
292. Even if defense counsel were to routinely shift cases to the associate circuit court
docket, prosecutorial costs would still increase. See supra notes 232-43 and accompanying
text.
293. See supra notes 100-09 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
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done when defendants were represented by counsel in the past,296
but given how pervasive the constitutional and evidentiary prob-
lems have been in Ferguson,297 that would leave very few cases—
and therefore little revenue—on the table if defense counsel were
available system-wide. 
For those cases that survive through conviction, additional
hearings would be likely. In Ferguson, nearly a quarter of the
community lives below the poverty line,298 and the Department of
Justice’s investigation found that law enforcement activities were
targeted at low-income residents.299 The imposition of the hundreds
of dollars of fines and fees for often very minor offenses may trigger
a successful Excessive Fines Clause challenge if, for example, that
amount is beyond the defendant’s means.300 Even if all other prac-
tices leading to the conviction were constitutional, given the econ-
omic vulnerability of those haled into Ferguson’s municipal court,
hearings to ensure that economic sanctions do not violate the
Excessive Fines Clause should be routine. Further, rather than
automatically issuing an arrest warrant and using incarceration to
both impose more fees and pry funds from the families and friends
of indigent defendants, Ferguson would be required to provide
Bearden hearings to assess the defendant’s ability to pay prior to an
arrest, as well as to provide alternative nonincarcerative methods
such as a reduction in the sanction imposed, a reasonable payment
plan (which would thwart Ferguson’s practice of imposing additional
fees for failure to pay), or community service.301 The combination of
additional hearings and these alternatives adds, again, to the city’s
expenditures and further decimates the revenue-generating value
of economic sanctions.302 That was not lost on municipal court Judge
296. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
297. See Deere, Two More, supra note 231.
298. See, e.g., ARCHCITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 35.
299. See FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 9, at 58.
300. See id. at 58 n.33; supra Part I.A.3.
301. See supra Part I.A.4.
302. See supra Part I.A.3. The Excessive Fines Clause and the requirement to conduct
Bearden hearings to assess whether a failure to pay is willful or due to poverty have a
symbiotic relationship that may ultimately result in a reduced need to conduct Bearden
hearings. A successful excessive fines claim would lead to economic sanctions imposed at an
amount the defendant has a meaningful ability to pay. Absent an unexpected exigency
limiting the defendant’s financial resources during the period of collections, the need to
conduct a Bearden hearing should drop significantly as the ability of defendants to pay the
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Vatterott, who explained that court officials making up the Munici-
pal Court Improvement Committee were “not theoretically opposed”
to holding the hearings required under Bearden, but that doing so
was “not practical” because it would require courts to increase court
time and expend resources.303
Second, advocacy engaged in by counsel beyond traditional
indigent defense representation separately aided in increasing costs
and decreasing municipal court revenue. By revealing municipal
court abuses, the ArchCity Defenders White Paper, and advocacy by
their attorneys and those at the St. Louis University Criminal
Defense Clinic, helped create a public uproar, contributing to social
justice activists’ push for municipal court reform304 and helping to
instigate the Department of Justice investigation into municipal
court abuses.305 The combined effect of those advocacy efforts led to
policy changes, including the elimination of the failure to appear
ordinance and the associated fees that, along with work litigating
individual cases, dramatically undercut the revenue-generating
capacity of the court.306
Both traditional and nontraditional individual representation
have had the capacity to create such effects in Ferguson because of-
ficials there are highly dependent upon the municipal court system
to generate revenue, because widespread constitutional violations
in its system gives counsel an opportunity to engage in extensive
litigation, and because the community members subjected to the
system were largely poor, raising the possibility that Excessive
Fines Clause hearings would be relevant in nearly every case.307 The
experience in Ferguson suggests, then, that traditional representa-
tion is most likely to have similar effects in jurisdictions with one or
more of the same characteristics. Because systems without counsel,
or where counsel is effectively denied through chronic underfund-
amount assessed rises.
303. See Freivogel, supra note 194.
304. See BETTER TOGETHER, MUNICIPAL COURTS, supra note 74, at 3, 13 (citing the work
of the ArchCity Defenders and St. Louis University Criminal Defense Clinic); MORE REPORT,
supra note 204, at 1 (same).
305. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 244-47 and accompanying text.
307. See supra Part I.A.3.
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ing,308 allow constitutional deficiencies to fester, the addition of
counsel could be particularly valuable in such systems.309
This is not to say that there is no cost-benefit effect of individual
defense representation in systems where revenue generation is less
urgent, constitutional abuses are less prevalent, or where defen-
dants are more likely to have economic stability; regardless of the
setting, litigation in individual cases creates system costs, and such
costs may help hold the potential for abuse in check. But for those
systems most in need of reform, by expanding system costs and
contracting revenues, individual defense representation can serve
as a particularly powerful tool.
The fact that an interest in revenue generation can lead to
shifting the cost-benefit analysis of a court system also does not
mean that revenue must be the sole motivating factor. Ferguson
shows, for example, that reforms are possible even in systems where
at least some actors have other, even irrational motivations,
including racial animus.310 Other motivations need not be elimi-
nated for reforms to occur; rather, fiscal motivations must align
with or outweigh other concerns. If, for example, each case in which
308. See infra notes 393-96 and accompanying text.
309. While the total absence of counsel is most likely to exist in courts handling low-level
offenses, the Supreme Court’s decision to limit the right to cases in which incarceration is on
the line, see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979), means that there is no right to coun-
sel even in the felony arena in the context of civil asset forfeitures. Such forfeitures occur
through a process that allows the government to seek money and property without securing
a criminal conviction based upon suspicion that the owner is involved in illegal activity. See,
e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (2012). Representation in such cases is rare because there is no right
to counsel per Scott and those subject to civil asset forfeiture rarely retain counsel because
the expense of doing so may surpass the value of money or property at issue. See, e.g., Robert
O’Harrow, Jr. et al., They Fought the Law. Who Won?, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/08/they-fought-the-law-who-won/ [https://perma.
cc/8Z4J-WHVX]. The ability of local, state, and federal governments to generate billions of
dollars in forfeiture revenue has been linked to questionable policing practices. See, e.g., Eric
Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda, 65
U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 40-41, 66-76 (1998) (documenting policing practices motivated by profit
motivation); Michael Sallah et al., Stop and Seize, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2014), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/06/stop-and-seize/ [https://perma.cc/YJ8V-B8LC]
(reporting on an investigation of government records showing that between September 2001
and September 2014, local, state, and federal law enforcement seized more than 2.5 billion
dollars, much of which was then used to fund programs such as drug task forces around the
country). Therefore, the addition of counsel to litigate claims in this context may dramatically
shift the cost-benefit of civil asset forfeiture policy.
310. See supra notes 210-22 and accompanying text.
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police subject a black youth to an unconstitutional “ped check”
results in a dismissal, thereby creating costs with no economic gain,
actors in the system motivated by a desire to generate revenue
rather than racial bias will pressure those whose motivations are
reversed to stop the use of “ped checks.” While fiscal concerns may
not be sufficiently substantial to force reform in every system, and
undoubtedly will not prevent all misbehavior,311 that does not mean
that defense representation has no political effect.312
In addition to the ways in which defense counsel created fiscal
pressure to force reforms, both traditional and nontraditional indi-
vidual representation had the capacity to effect change in Ferguson
because that work created fiscal pressure on the very city officials
who had control over the functioning of the municipal court sys-
tem.313 Governments are bureaucracies that often have multiple
decision makers attending to any particular area of governance.314
Crime policy decisions, for example, may be made by those expend-
ing resources, receiving revenues from economic sanctions, or
both.315 Therefore, the ability to replicate the effects of representation
311. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation
of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 386 (2000) (arguing that, because police
officers have discretion to stop and arrest, improper behavior may occur even where officials
“are motivated to direct the agency to engage in socially optimal behavior”); cf. Schwartz,
supra note 286, at 1201-02 (noting that fiscal pressures may encourage officials to attend to
liability risks created by improper policing, but that “[r]equiring law enforcement agencies to
bear the costs of lawsuits does not eliminate misconduct by those agencies”).
312. See Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 847-48 (2001) (arguing that constitutional
litigation can create “a deterrent effect on the behavior of ... governmental actors and enti-
ties”).
313. See Deere, Legal Bills, supra note 173.
314. See Levinson, supra note 311, at 380 (“Government is not a monolithic decisionmaker,
but a multilayered collection of politicians and bureaucrats with different, and often con-
flicting, goals and agendas.”).
315. This misalignment between expenditures and revenues creates interesting power
dynamics across governmental entities. See Marsh & Gerrick, supra note 123, at 111 (noting
that financial incentives may be misaligned, for example, when “the entity that is seeking to
collect the economic sanction is not the same entity that pays the cost of incarceration”). This
is not, however, unique to the issue of access to counsel but is part of a larger phenomenon
in the criminal arena. See, e.g., LISA L. MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY,
AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME CONTROL 8-11 (2008) (investigating how the participation of
interest groups favoring tough-on-crime policies at the local level affected crime policy at the
state and national level); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
253-57 (2011) (arguing that the funding of prisons at the state and federal level and policing
at the local level results in both over-punishment and under-policing); W. David Ball, Defund-
2017] LESSONS FROM FERGUSON 1227
seen in Ferguson will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction due to
different formulas for moving monies into and out of criminal sys-
tems.316 But despite that complication, the growing use of economic
sanctions by government officials to generate revenue nationally
means that the potential for individual defense representation to
create pressure on key decision makers and therefore to shift the
cost-benefit of crime policies has broad applicability.317
B. How Individual Representation Can Aid in Creating a Public
Reckoning
In addition to creating fiscal pressure, individual defense counsel
in Ferguson created and even mandated a public conversation about
crime policy in ways that contributed to and amplified reform efforts
both within and beyond the tribunal. Ferguson shows how this may
occur in two key ways. First, defense counsel can force the govern-
ment to take a public position on its manner of governance through
both traditional indigent defense representation and civil rights
litigation. Second, by serving on the ground day-to-day within a
criminal system, defense attorneys are in a unique position to spot,
and make public, patterns of abuse.
1. Forcing the Government to Take a Public Stance
Just as in other forms of public law litigation, individual defense
representation has the capacity to compel the government to take
a position—to acknowledge its behavior in a specific, articulated
way.318 That public stance reveals details regarding the government’s
ing State Prisons, 50 CRIM. L. BULL. 1060, 1084-86 (2014) (arguing that centralization of
prisons at state budgetary level allows jurisdictions to hide racial inequalities and disparate
treatment in policing and prosecution by averaging those practices across localities).
316. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 286, at 1194-95 (describing varying budgetary arrangements
related to policing in different jurisdictions). Compare, e.g., FERGUSON VIOLATIONS SCHEDULE,
supra note 58, at 1, with NOT JUST A FERGUSON PROBLEM, supra note 26, at 10.
317. See supra note 26.
318. See Depoorter, supra note 285, at 834 (“Litigation is an adversarial process that
frames issues and draws individuals into taking sides.”); see also, e.g., Orleans Public Defend-
ers (@OrleansDefender), TWITTER (July 9, 2016, 12:18 PM), https://twitter.com/Orleans
Defender/status/751858033664274432/photo/1 [https://perma.cc/K2VN-QHZ5] (“It’s our job
as public defenders to demand our clients’ voices matter, our communities matter & fight for
change.... Through litigation, narration, and investigation, we tell judges, prosecutors, jurors
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behavior, as well as the purported justification for it, and does so in
a public forum. This public statement regarding governmental
policies and practices, necessitated by litigation, provides an
opportunity for constituents to evaluate the crime policy decisions
of their elected officials, and creates pressure on officials when their
behavior violates the public’s expectations.319 This may occur even
when officials had not blessed or even been aware of the misbehav-
ior at issue. As Myriam Gilles has explained: “‘Good’ municipal man-
agers may respond to previously unknown information concerning
the departments over which they have jurisdiction; ‘bad’ managers
may be responding only to the publicity that attends the exposure
of this information.”320 In either case, the public revelation of
malfeasance can push officials toward reform.321
We saw traditional indigent defense representation create this
effect in Ferguson, for example, when defense counsel’s litigation of
several issues in a series of failure to comply cases led the prosecu-
tion to take the position that arrest should equate to guilt.322
Protestors seized on news reports of the government’s position in
calling for the prosecutor’s ouster.323 Just as with the fiscal effect of
individual defense representation, an expansion of defense services
system-wide would have created even more opportunities to force
officials to defend or repudiate the municipal court system. For
example, if an individual defendant were to have challenged the
system’s focus on revenue generation as violating due process,324
municipal officials would have been forced to publicly recognize the
that our clients’ lives matter, our clients’ families’ lives matter, our clients’ communities’ lives
matter.”).
319. See Emily Chiang, Institutional Reform Shaming, 120 PENN. ST. L. REV. 53, 81 (2015)
(positing that litigation can be used to shame public actors by serving “as a call to community
members to take action by joining in the condemnation”).
320. Gilles, supra note 312, at 861; see also Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from
Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841, 844-45 (2012) (explaining how officials may learn about
policing practices through civil rights litigation).
321. See Gilles, supra note 312, at 860 (noting that the exposure of unconstitutional
behavior can create a “desire to avoid adverse publicity, the cost and burden of litigation, and
the sting of a determination of liablity”). See generally Chiang, supra note 319, at 54-55
(regarding the shaming effect of litigation).
322. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
323. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
324. Each of the due process cases establishing these rules arose through advocacy on
behalf of individual defendants. See supra note 48.
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myriad facts later uncovered in the various investigations of the
city’s practices detailed in Part I. Likewise, issues raised at
adjudication, such as a Fourth Amendment challenge to police use
of “wanteds,” “ped checks,” or other stops without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion,325 would require the officer involved to testify
publicly regarding the invalidity of the stop, revealing to the public
the failure of the police chief to control police forces. A challenge to
an ordinance—such as failure to comply—as unconstitutionally
vague would require police to explain publicly the ways they use the
statute to entrap and harass citizens in order to write more and
more tickets.326 While any one of these challenges raised in just a
few cases may allow officials to claim the officers involved were
merely “bad apples” rather than symptoms of larger problems
within the system of government, in jurisdictions like Ferguson
where constitutional violations are rampant, the sheer volume of
constitutional claims that might be raised if access to counsel were
afforded broadly would be nearly impossible to disclaim.327
The same effect would be had in claims raised post-conviction. If
a defendant were to raise an Excessive Fines Clause challenge at
sentencing, the choice to defend the severity of an offense would re-
quire the municipality to explain, for example, why officials believed
that ordinances including “Manner of Walking in Roadway” and
“High Grass and Weeds” were so serious that they justified subject-
ing their constituents to insurmountable debt and the perpetual risk
of incarceration.328 Likewise, because Bearden requires the court to
consider alternatives to incarceration for those unable to pay, legal
claims would require officials to explain why they flatly rejected the
alternatives offered by the Bearden Court: reductions in debt,
reasonable payment plans, and community service.329
Further, Ferguson provides an example of how individual defense
counsel can collaborate or inspire other forms of civil rights
litigation, which also can force the government to acknowledge its
behavior. After investigating systemic abuses in Ferguson, the class
325. See supra notes 100-04.
326. See supra notes 105-07, 111-14.
327. See Gilles, supra note 312, at 861-63 (regarding the “fault-fixing” function of
constitutional litigation as “localizing culpability in the municipality itself”).
328. See supra Part I.A.3.
329. See supra Part I.A.4.
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action initiated by the ArchCity Defenders, St. Louis University
Criminal Defense Clinic, and Equal Justice Under the Law included
a claim that Ferguson’s denial of defense representation in collec-
tion hearings was unconstitutional.330 Ferguson’s collections
practices so obviously miss that mark that in response to the class
action complaint, Ferguson did not dispute that its failure to provide
defense counsel violated due process.331 
In both traditional individual representation and in class
litigation efforts, attorneys in Ferguson were effective at creating
public pressure because, by speaking to the press and collaborating
with social justice advocates, they kept public attention on the
positions Ferguson took in litigation. A key lesson from Ferguson,
then, is that individual defense counsel can be most effective at
creating public pressure for reform if attorneys both raise claims in
litigation that force the government to stake out a position and work
to ensure those positions are made public so as to foster collabora-
tion with other reformers and public debate.
2. Identifying Patterns of Abuse
Individual defense counsel can also use its vantage point to spot
patterns of abuse and make them public. Particularly when counsel
exposes behaviors that implicate “the cultural and political forces
that give rise to or countenance police misconduct”332 or other
systemic deficiencies within criminal systems, their work can create
significant pressure for reform.
In Ferguson, this occurred most notably through the issuance of
the ArchCity Defenders White Paper in which its attorneys
documented the results of a court-watching project.333 The White
Paper had tremendous consequences for Ferguson. It quickly caught
national press attention,334 contributed to other investigations into
330. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 171, at 40.
331. See Fant v. City of Ferguson, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1034 (E.D. Mo. 2015) (“[T]he City
does not dispute that appointment of counsel, or waivers thereof, were required.”).
332. See Gilles, supra note 312, at 859.
333. See supra notes 181-84 and accompanying text. 
334. See, e.g., Koran Addo, ArchCity Defenders Saw Problems with Municipal Courts Before
Ferguson Turmoil, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.stltoday.com/news/
local/metro/archcity-defenders-saw-problems-with-municipal-courts-before-ferguson-
turmoil/article_f1493907-7c8c-55af-a68b-6e36df0c2cae.html [https://perma.cc/GZG6-EWJD].
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municipal court practices by social justice advocates and the
Department of Justice,335 and also led the ArchCity Defenders to
collaborate with the St. Louis University Criminal Defense Clinic
and Equal Justice Under the Law to initiate a civil rights class
action.336
The White Paper also aided reform efforts by identifying limita-
tions in the law—places where the constitutional and statutory
rules fail to protect social norms337—thereby helping to identify the
need for social justice activism outside of the court. For example, by
identifying how the use of failure to appear ordinances in St. Louis
County’s municipal courts led to the incarceration of people unable
to pay economic sanctions,338 the ArchCity Defenders made concrete
and public a way in which existing laws violated community expec-
tations. Ultimately, with pressure from those attorneys and social
justice advocates, Ferguson officials acquiesced in eliminating the
charge.339
335. See BETTER TOGETHER, MUNICIPAL COURTS, supra note 74, at 11-14; MORE REPORT,
supra note 204, at 2; see also supra note 208 and accompanying text.
336. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
337. See Depoorter, supra note 285, at 821, 836.
338. See ARCHCITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 9.
339. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. A willingness to reach out to other
advocates can also be critical for addressing limitations on the defense function. For example,
indigent defense counsel’s ability to directly attack certain aspects of conscious or unconscious
bias in policing and court practices are hampered by the nature of the claims counsel have at
their disposal. As Devon Carbado has detailed in depth, the Fourth Amendment not only
allows for, but legalizes, racial profiling by constitutionalizing pretextual stops, see Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996), and by allowing police to consider ethnicity, see
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975), appearance, see United States
v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 4-5, 10 (1989), and the nature of the neighborhood where the stop
occurs, see Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000), when assessing suspicion. See Devon
W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth Amendment
Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (describing how race is a
structural feature of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); see also Utah v. Streiff, 136 S. Ct.
2056, 2068 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (describing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
regarding police stops). Yet, indigent defense counsel must necessarily rely on that Fourth
Amendment doctrine to raise challenges related to the existence of probable cause and
reasonable suspicion. Likewise, as Gabriel Chin has written, courts often assess risk and the
sufficiency of punishment—in the context of bail determinations, assessing plea bargains, and
at sentencing—by relying on facially race-neutral factors such as home ownership, employ-
ment history, and residential neighborhood. Gabriel J. Chin, Essay, Race and the Disappoint-
ing Right to Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2236, 2255-58 (2013). By zealously advocating for clients
who fare better on such assessments—clients who are more likely to be white and econom-
ically stable—indigent defense counsel risk further entrenching racial and class disparities
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The court-watching program that set the stage for these various
forms of advocacy is akin to the day-to-day representation that
occurs when counsel is systemically provided, even though in this
case it was done to supplement the limited representation pro bono
counsel could provide.340 What the work of counsel in Ferguson
suggests, then, is that where indigent defense counsel documents
patterns of abuse and makes those patterns public, it has the
potential to significantly affect public debate on crime policy.
C. How the Limitations of Using Ferguson as a Model Support
Systemic Access to Counsel
In considering what we might learn from the experience in
Ferguson about the role of indigent defense counsel in creating
systemic reform, it is also important to consider limitations of using
Ferguson as a model.
First, it is impossible to measure the exact percentage of fiscal or
public pressure created by individual defense representation as
opposed to other actors in the arena, just as it is impossible to say
whether the Department of Justice would have been alerted to the
need for municipal court reform through its investigation into
policing in Ferguson without having first considered the ArchCity
Defenders White Paper. Likewise, this study of Ferguson does not
strictly measure the comparative weight of these pressures against
other fiscal or political considerations Ferguson officials might have
had. So while Ferguson is an example of how individual defense
representation can create such pressures, it cannot do so with
mathematical precision. Although this certainly means that optimal
in criminal systems. See id.; see also Marsh & Gerrick, supra note 123, at 117-19 (noting that
Bearden’s distinction between willful nonpayment and an inability to pay economic sanctions,
though protective, invokes “the rhetoric of personal responsibility [that] rings of barely
disguised, and at times undisguised, racism” (footnotes omitted)). Indigent defense counsel
has an important role to play in alerting other reformers of the limitations of established legal
claims so that efforts can be directed at forcing change through other forms of advocacy.
340. See ARCHCITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 1.
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levels of deterrence cannot be identified,341 it does not mean that
individual defense representation has no political value.342
Second, a separate, though related, problem is the way in which
circumstances in Ferguson have been distinct from what is happen-
ing in other jurisdictions. It is becoming increasingly clear that, in
terms of using criminal systems for revenue generation and ignoring
constitutional restrictions, Ferguson is far from alone,343 but there
are ways in which it is unique. The shooting of Michael Brown,
which occurred on the heels of the controversial use of deadly force
by police against Eric Garner in New York City,344 brought national
attention to Ferguson. With that national attention came the
Department of Justice investigation and an exceptional level of
scrutiny on Ferguson’s municipal court system resulting in litiga-
tion by both civil rights litigators and the Department. Work to
reform the use of economic sanctions is happening elsewhere, but
the reach is necessarily limited. Civil rights litigators including
those involved in class litigation in St. Louis County, as well as the
Southern Poverty Law Center, the Southern Center for Human
Rights, and the ACLU, have been doing yeoman’s work on reforming
the use of economic sanctions through class litigation in various
jurisdictions across the country.345 Likewise, there are other
341. See Levinson, supra note 311, at 347-48 (arguing that “exchanging economic costs and
benefits into political currency” is too complex to ensure that cost increases will result in
socially desirable outcomes).
342. See Gilles, supra note 312, at 847-48 (critiquing the notion that because fiscal pressure
created through litigation may not result in optimal deterrence of government misbehavior,
it has no deterrent effect).
343. See, e.g., supra note 26.
344. See John Lewis, Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and the ‘Other America,’ ATLANTIC (Dec.
15, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/michael-brown-eric-garner-
other-america-john-lewis/383750 [https://perma.cc/4UJQ-DQM7].
345. See, e.g., Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, Directing
the Dissemination of Notice, and Scheduling a Final Settlement Hearing at 4, Jenkins v. City
of Jennings, No. 4:15-CV-00252-CEJ (E.D. Mo. filed July 13, 2016); Walker v. City of Calhoun,
No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016); Mitchell v. City of
Montgomery, No. 2:14cv186-MHT, 2014 WL 11099432, at *2-3, *16 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 17, 2014);
Class Action Complaint at 50-51, Kennedy v. City of Biloxi, No. 1:15-cv-00348-HSO-JCG (S.D.
Miss. Oct. 21, 2015); Class Action Complaint at 26, Bell v. City of Jackson, No. 3:15-cv-732
TSL-RHW (S.D. Miss. Oct. 9, 2015); Complaint at 12-13, Foster v. City of Alexander City, No.
3:15-cv-647-WKW (M.D. Ala. filed Sept. 8, 2015); Complaint at 16, Edwards v. Red Hills
Cmty. Prob., LLC, No. 1:15-cv-67 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 10, 2015); Complaint at 1-2, Thompson v.
DeKalb County, No. 1:15-cv-00280-TWT (N.D. Ga. Jan. 29, 2015); Complaint at 45, Thomas
v. City of Gulfport, No. 1:05-cv-349-LG-RHW (S.D. Miss. July 21, 2005); Complaint for
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examples of public defender organizations engaging in systemic
advocacy of the sort undertaken by the ArchCity Defenders and the
St. Louis University Criminal Defense Clinic,346 and working to
ensure that defense work garners public attention.347 But it would
be infeasible for these civil rights organizations to engage in the
kinds of advocacy happening in Ferguson nationwide, and in some
jurisdictions public defenders are limited to engaging in only tradi-
tional defense services. And while under the Obama Administration
the Department of Justice issued a letter to state and local courts
making clear it intended to continue its advocacy in jurisdictions
that abuse criminal systems for the purpose of revenue genera-
tion,348 there is no guarantee that such efforts will continue under
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶ 70, Fuentes v. Benton County, No. 15-2-002976-1 (Super.
Ct. Yakima Co., Wash. Oct. 6, 2015).
346. For example, the attorneys who founded the ArchCity Defenders modeled their
organization after The Bronx Defenders, see Harvey Interview, supra note 1, a public defender
organization that combines representation in individual criminal cases with community
outreach and education, impact litigation, and legislative advocacy, see Our Mission and
Story, BRONX DEF., http://www.bronxdefenders.org/who-we-are/ [https://perma.cc/APW7-
7GL5]. The Bronx Defenders engage in holistic representation, see id., and have been praised
for the innovative ways in which they have shifted criminal practices in New York. See Nick
Pinto, Making Bail Better, VILLAGE VOICE (Oct. 10, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.villagevoice.
com/news/making-bail-better-6436447 [https://perma.cc/XQ8U-K4RM] (describing The Bronx
Defenders’ creation of a community bail fund to ensure the release of clients from pretrial
detention as “one of the most remarkable experiments in criminal justice in recent years, a
pilot program for a growing movement that might be on the verge of changing the face of
criminal justice in New York”); see also Natapoff, supra note 27, at 1075-76 (describing the
work of The Bronx Defenders and similar public defender organizations); Roberts, supra note
27, at 102-03 (describing how, following individual challenges by students in a legal clinic and
the filing of a federal lawsuit in which The Bronx Defenders served as co-counsel, the Bronx
District Attorney changed its practice of filing misdemeanor trespass charges based solely on
police reports, opting instead to first “interview the arresting officer to determine whether the
arrest was lawful,” which was followed by a decline in trespass arrests of 38.2 percent).
347. For example, to draw attention to the chronic underfunding of indigent defense in
Missouri, Michael Barrett, Director of the Missouri State Public Defender, wrote and pub-
lished a letter in which he described the funding crisis and then used a state law allowing him
to conscript members of the bar to serve as defense counsel to appoint Jay Nixon to a case. See
Letter from Michael Barrett, Dir., Mo. State Pub. Def., to Jay Nixon, Governor of Mo. (Aug.
2, 2016), http://www.publicdefender.mo.gov/Newsfeed/Delegation_of_Representation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W4UZ-K7LZ].
348. See Letter from Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights
Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, and Lisa Foster, Dir., Office for Access to Justice, U.S. Dep’t of Jus-
tice, to Colleagues (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/832461/download [https://
perma.cc/3UDZ-CRGY].
2017] LESSONS FROM FERGUSON 1235
the Trump Administration.349 Even if it did, a nationwide effort by
the Department of the kind seen in Ferguson is also infeasible.
Therefore, in many jurisdictions it is unlikely that the extent of the
combined pressure of indigent defense counsel and other litigation
threats will be readily duplicated.
Likewise, Michael Brown’s death sparked protests regarding
police brutality that quickly came to include calls for municipal
court reform. To be sure, it is possible to look at Ferguson and see
the role the ArchCity Defenders and St. Louis University Criminal
Defense Clinic played in bringing municipal court issues to the fore.
In addition to the ArchCity Defenders White Paper, those serving
as individual defense counsel participated in public debates, called
attention to the plight of their clients in the press, and supported
grass-roots reformers by publicly questioning why social justice
advocates were not afforded an opportunity to participate in munici-
pal court officials’ reform efforts.350 What is not clear is whether the
level of social justice activism seen in Ferguson would have been so
intense or so sustained if it had not first been prompted by the
shooting of Michael Brown.
In other words, Ferguson had a confluence of circumstances and
players that is unprecedented. In many jurisdictions where indigent
defense counsel could have the most fiscal and political effect be-
cause of dependence on revenue generation or patterns of unconsti-
tutional behavior, abuses are, put simply, so ordinary that they go
without notice. 
In many ways, however, this supports the need for access to
indigent defense counsel all the more. Even setting aside pressures
created by the Department of Justice, class litigation, and social jus-
tice advocates, the work of attorneys engaged in traditional indigent
349. See Matt Zapotosky et al., President Trump’s Justice Dept. Could See Less Scrutiny
of Police, More Surveillance of Muslims, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/world/national-security/donald-trump-preached-law-and-order-now-likely-comes-
less-police-scrutiny-more-surveillance-of-muslims/2016/11/10/c430a234-a696-11e6-ba59-
a7d93165c6d4_story.html [https://perma.cc/S7ZF-RXBZ] (contrasting aggressive civil rights
enforcement by the Obama Administration’s Department of Justice with the law and order
rhetoric espoused by Donald Trump during his presidential campaign); Eli Hager et al., 8
Ways Jeff Sessions Could Change Criminal Justice, MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 18, 2016, 4:53
PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/11/18/8-ways-jeff-sessions-could-change-
criminal-justice [https://perma.cc/TG44-WXNV] (same).
350. See supra notes 196-205 and accompanying text.
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defense representation created both fiscal and public pressure on
key decision makers in Ferguson.351 And that occurred even though
counsel was available in only a handful of cases. System-wide de-
fense representation in Ferguson would necessarily expand the costs
of maintaining the municipal court and would force the government
to take public positions on its behavior in an even greater number
of cases, even without the involvement of other actors. Given that
indigent defense counsel may be the only avenue to create such
pressures in most jurisdictions, access to counsel becomes that much
more critical. 
III. THEORETICAL AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
In this Part, I turn to the theoretical and normative implications
that can be drawn from the work of individual criminal defense
counsel in Ferguson. Though full examination of these implications
are beyond the scope of this Article, I conclude here by suggesting
that analysis of individual representation in Ferguson is relevant to
two areas worthy of continued inquiry. First, I consider what this
study of Ferguson can contribute to the long-standing debate over
whether government overreach in establishing the breadth and
severity of criminal law is best checked through application of con-
stitutional rights writ large, or whether constitutional procedural
rules should be abandoned in favor of local control over policing.
Second, I suggest that this study of Ferguson illustrates how
discussions concerning access to counsel are often too constrained.
On the one hand, viewing access to counsel as a purely constitu-
tional issue obscures the role of political choice in denying represen-
tation. On the other, the constitutional right to counsel has been
hampered by a failure of the Supreme Court to adequately account
for defense counsel’s importance as a check against systemic abuses.
A. Implications Regarding the Role of Constitutional Procedural
Rights and Local Governance in Criminal Justice Reform
The experience in Ferguson has implications for a broader
theoretical debate about how best to understand and check the
351. See supra notes 231-49 and accompanying text.
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breadth and severity of criminal law, and particularly the role of
constitutional procedural rules. Criminal procedure scholars gener-
ally agree that the Supreme Court has placed few restrictions on
lawmakers’ ability to criminalize conduct and set punishment and
has failed to meaningfully restrict prosecutorial power to charge and
bargain. As a result, prosecutors can threaten to increase the quan-
tity or severity of charges to force defendants to plead guilty.352
Many scholars have argued that the breadth and severity of crim-
inal law in the United States also may result in the selective
enforcement of criminal laws against poor and minority communi-
ties.353 Despite common ground regarding the consequences of
highly punitive criminal laws, there has been a long-standing
debate regarding how best to correct this situation.
The debate is largely shaped by the work of William J. Stuntz,
who argued that constitutional procedural rules caused a punitive
backlash.354 According to Stuntz, stringent rules aimed at protecting
defendants prompted lawmakers to expand the breadth of what con-
stitutes criminal activity and the severity of punishments, leading
to too much prosecutorial power as well as selective enforcement
against poor, and particularly black, communities.355 He also be-
lieved that the backlash contributed to the ineffectiveness of indi-
gent defense counsel by prompting lawmakers to underfund defense
systems and by inducing indigent defenders to focus on the wrong
thing—procedural rules—instead of guilt or innocence.356 To coun-
teract these problems, Stuntz would deconstitutionalize procedural
regulation357—including the type of Fourth Amendment protections
352. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Does Liberal Procedure Cause Punitive Substance?
Preliminary Evidence from Some Natural Experiments, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 459, 460 (2014);
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 535-38
(2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, Pathological Politics]; William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution
of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 791, 832-34 (2006) [hereinafter Stuntz, Political
Constitution]; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Law Versus Politics, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 138, 142,
144, 146, 148 (2013) (reviewing STUNTZ, supra note 315).
353. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes African Americans to Police
Violence?, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 167 (2016); Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra
note 352, at 815-16.
354. See Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note 352, at 789-91, 798, 816.
355. See id.
356. See id. at 836; see also STUNTZ, supra note 315, at 299-300.
357. See, e.g., STUNTZ, supra note 315, at 218-20. In addition to preserving the right to
counsel, see Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note 352, at 836, Stuntz would continue to
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detailed in Part I—in exchange for local control over procedure and
policing under the theory that, if left unregulated, lawmakers would
develop procedures and practices that are fair and evenly employed
across all segments of society.358
On the other side of the debate are scholars including David
Sklansky and Robert Weisberg, who have argued that the punitive
turn is better explained by variances in political power and that
constitutional challenges writ large have the capacity to cabin
lawmakers’ ability to expand criminal law and punishment.359 They
envision a system in which the Supreme Court and criminal justice
regulate, to some degree, excessive force, discrimination, corruption, and interrogation
practices, see id. at 833-34.
358. See STUNTZ, supra note 315, at 39 (“Make criminal justice more locally democratic, and
justice will be more moderate, more egalitarian, and more effective at controlling crime.”); see
also id. at 283, 287. Stuntz also suggested that trial judges should have the power to dismiss
charges for any reason and reduce sentences in order to serve as a check on prosecutorial
power in plea bargaining. See Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note 352, at 836, 838, 842.
While this may be a useful reform, the experience in Ferguson suggests it should come with
a good deal of oversight so that such powers are not merely used to protect individuals with
political power. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. Other remedies proposed by
Stuntz fit comfortably within the thesis of this project. For example, he proposed remedies
designed to improve system transparency and to ensure equal application of the law, includ-
ing extensive data collection regarding charging, conviction, and sentencing practices, and
requirements that the prosecution prove systemic enforcement by comparison to the handling
of factually similar cases. See Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note 352, at 834, 836-38,
840-42. He also tied the ability to use data to “identify and punish worst practices,” partic-
ularly with respect to racial discrimination, to the Department of Justice’s power to bring suit
to seek reform. See id. at 834-35. Perhaps most importantly, Stuntz supported the full funding
of indigent defense. See supra note 356 and accompanying text.
359. See David Alan Sklansky, Killer Seatbelts and Criminal Procedure, 119 HARV. L. REV.
F. 56, 63-64 (2006) (replying to Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note 352); Robert
Weisberg, First Causes and the Dynamics of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 131, 134-
35, 137-39 (2006) (same). In addition to Sklansky and Weisberg, Donald Dripps has disputed
the claim that the Warren Court’s procedural revolution caused a punitive backlash. See
Dripps, supra note 352, at 478-79. Dripps conducted an empirical evaluation showing that
jurisdictions that both did and did not require significant shifts in practice as a result of the
new procedural rules became more punitive over time, at largely consistent rates, and decades
after the Warren Court’s procedural revolution. See id. at 478-92; see also id. at 473-74 (noting
that Congress’s response to the procedural revolution, the Omnibus Crime Control & Safe
Streets Act of 1968, was not substantive, but procedural, and the federal punitive turn did not
occur until the mid-1980s). Stephen Schulhofer has examined crime rates, demographic data,
and the rollback of procedural protections by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts and similarly
concluded that it is not possible to prove a causal link between the Warren Court’s procedural
decisions and the punitive turn. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice, Local Democracy,
and Constitutional Rights, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1065-79 (2013) (reviewing STUNTZ, supra
note 315).
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actors are in a dialogue: when the Court speaks, those actors
conform or change laws and practices in response, and the Court
then has an opportunity to bless or strike down those changes and
address any violations of its rules.360 Sklansky and Weisberg,
therefore, favor the continued use of both substantive and proce-
dural constitutional rules as a check on political overreach.361
Ferguson provides an opportunity to test these theories in a
system where lower-level offenses are punished primarily through
economic sanctions. The experience in Ferguson suggests that
Stuntz’s exchange of procedural rules for local control is ill con-
ceived. Instead, Ferguson supports Sklansky and Weisberg’s
argument that both substantive and constitutional procedural rules
provide an important check on governmental action—presuming, of
course, that indigent defense counsel is available to litigate such
claims.
First, Ferguson shows that prizing local governance over consti-
tutional procedural regulation opens the door for the design and
maintenance of systems that value revenue generation over fair-
ness. While scholars such as Rachel Harmon have argued that it is
critical to consider both economic outputs and inputs to criminal
systems,362 the procedural debate has largely focused on how proce-
dural rules create system costs.363 Yet, in Ferguson and an increasing
360. See Sklansky, supra note 359, at 59-61 (describing “a story of constitutional law and
statutory innovation sharing a regulatory space, to their mutual benefit”); Weisberg, supra
note 359, at 137-39.
361. See Sklansky, supra note 359, at 63-64 (emphasizing the value of Court-made constitu-
tional rules); Weisberg, supra note 359, at 134-35 (questioning the motivations of a political
response to loosened Fourth Amendment protections).
362. See Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 870, 889-91 (2015).
363. Stuntz’s work, for example, was notable for his attention to the potential effects of how
resource limitations could pervert policing and prosecution, see, e.g., Stuntz, Political
Constitution, supra note 352, at 784, 815-16 (arguing that costs imposed by constitutional law
skew aggressive policing toward poor and minority communities), and even noted budgeting
pressures at the local level, see id. at 808. Yet, fines, fees, surcharges, and other forms of
economic sanction simply were not part of Stuntz’s equation, meriting only passing mention
in his later work and even then without reference to the perverse incentives economic
sanctions may create for local officials. See, e.g., STUNTZ, supra note 315, at 3 (noting that
state troopers have power to selectively enforce traffic laws, “handing out fines for driving at
speeds no higher than most cars on the road”); id. at 67, 76 (noting the Excessive Fines Clause
as among the “mild constraints of the Eighth Amendment”); id. at 117 (describing fines, costs,
and restitution as part of a statutory punishment for the violation of an 1875 civil rights
statute later struck down in the Civil Rights Cases in 1883); id. at 125 (describing O’Neil v.
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number of jurisdictions around the country,364 the interest in
generating revenue also has implications for the breadth and
severity of criminal law and attendant problems of prosecutorial
power and selective enforcement. Without a meaningful check, local
governments can and do use criminal systems to generate revenue
at the expense of their constituents, saddling people with unman-
ageable debt, and even going to such lengths as incarcerating those
who have no meaningful ability to pay.365 Counsel’s use of both
substantive and procedural rules can be the basis of a powerful
check on such behavior. 
Second, while understanding fiscal motivation is critical, it is
unlikely to be the sole motivating factor at the local level. In
particular, shifting power to local governance without a meaningful
check underestimates the long record of local governments focusing
the enforcement of low-level public order and vice offenses against
the politically vulnerable—particularly poor and black communi-
ties—just as Ferguson has done.366 Historians have shown that long
before the Warren Court’s procedural revolution, policing practices
Vermont, an 1892 case in which incarceration in lieu of paying a fine was challenged under
the Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clauses); see also William J. Stuntz,
Of Seatbelts and Sentences, Supreme Court Justices and Spending Patterns—Understanding
the Unraveling of American Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 148 (2006) (replying to
Sklansky, supra note 359, and Weisberg, supra note 359) (no mention of economic sanctions);
Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 352 (same); Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note
352 (same); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997) (same).
364. See supra note 26.
365. See Tamar R. Birckhead, The New Peonage, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1595, 1602-03
(2015); Colgan, supra note 133, at 285-95.
366. See Tracey L. Meares, Everything Old Is New Again: Fundamental Fairness and the
Legitimacy of Criminal Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 105, 106-07 (2005) (“From the close of
Reconstruction to the modern civil rights revolution, law enforcement played a central role
in maintaining the exclusion of African-Americans and other minorities from the Nation’s
political life. When suspected, however remotely, of wrongdoing, these citizens became the
targets of sweeping and invasive tactics of investigation.”). In addition to the historical use
of selective enforcement, Stuntz’s causal thesis is undermined by the long history of legislative
support for prosecutorial power to force pleas, which existed long before the Warren Court.
As George Fisher documented in his groundbreaking historical work on early criminal prac-
tices, legislative manipulation of substantive criminal law and sentencing severity for the pur-
poses of increasing prosecutorial power to plea bargain has dated back to the early nineteenth
century. See George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 864 (2000). For
an additional critique of Stuntz’s historical account, see Schulhofer, supra note 359, at 1049-
58.
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have targeted racial minorities for low-level offenses.367 In the recon-
struction-era South, newly freed slaves were subjected to a series of
vaguely written minor offenses related to black people’s public lives,
particularly with regard to movement and employment,368 that came
to be known as the Black Codes.369 A key example of the Black
Codes was the crime of vagrancy, “the offense of a person not being
able to prove at a given moment that he or she is employed.”370
Following arrest, local officials disincentivized trial by charging fees
for each portion of the trial process.371 Courts summarily sentenced
black men, women, and children to pay fines they could not manage
and then leased the “convicts” to plantations, mines, and mills to
serve out the debt.372 In the North and West, police also targeted
black people for arrest on charges of being “suspicious characters,”373
vagrancy,374 or other public order375 and vice376 offenses. Selective
367. Two of the most notable historical contributions in this regard have been Douglas A.
Blackmon’s work regarding policing and court practices in the Jim Crow South and Khalil
Gibran Muhammad’s exploration of how empirical studies and statistical data were used to
create the perception of criminality among black people in the age of the Great Migration in
the northern and western United States. See generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY
ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK PEOPLE IN AMERICA FROM THE CIVIL WAR
TO WORLD WAR II (2008); KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS:
RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2010).
368. See BLACKMON, supra note 367, at 53-54, 99-100.
369. See, e.g., Gary Stewart, Note, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy of Racial
Hegemony in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249, 2258-59 (1998). Stuntz spoke
about the Black Codes and the practice of debt peonage, but chiefly to contrast the size of
police forces in the North and South. See STUNTZ, supra note 315, at 102-03, 144-45.
370. See BLACKMON, supra note 367, at 1; see also id. at 53, 124.
371. See id. at 66, 100, 108-09.
372. See, e.g., id. at 65; see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 31 (rev. ed. 2012) (comparing the relationship
between penal labor and slavery); Donna Murch, Paying for Punishment: The New Debtors’
Prison, BOS. REV. (Aug. 1, 2016), https://bostonreview.net/editors-picks-us/donna-murch-
paying-punishment [https://perma.cc/U9W8-V274] (comparing historical practices with mod-
ern charges imposed on criminal defendants and prisoners).
373. MUHAMMAD, supra note 367, at 247; see also id. at 248 (describing a 1929 National
Urban League study of Denver arrests on charges of “[i]nvestigation”); id. at 240 (describing
a study in which a Chicago municipal court judge accounted the frequent arrest of black
people “without a bit of evidence”).
374. See, e.g., id. at 244 (describing a police raid of all black-operated pool halls in a north-
ern city in which 160 people were arrested for vagrancy—a charge directly tied to unemploy-
ment—even though 60 of those arrested were able to produce proof of employment); id. at 248
(regarding vagrancy arrests in Denver).
375. See, e.g., id. at 248 (describing a National Urban League study of public order offense
arrests in Troy, New York, in which 78 percent of arrests of black people were ultimately
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enforcement of these types of charges, in other words, predated the
Warren Court by generations and remains a key part of local gov-
ernment practices in places like Ferguson.377 One need only fast-
forward to the way in which Ferguson police used offenses aimed at
public behaviors of black people—including movement, through the
use of vehicle stops and “ped checks” and offenses such as “Manner
of Walking in Roadway”—to see the historical parallels.378 The
absence of counsel to seek enforcement of constitutional rules—in-
cluding substantive rules that restrict the use of vague statutes and
procedural rules that check policing within politically vulnerable
communities—helped sustain a system in Ferguson rife with selec-
tive enforcement.
Third, policing practices in Ferguson undermine the notion put
forth by Stuntz that constitutional procedural claims distract
defense counsel from litigating guilt and innocence. Rather, Fergu-
son’s practices show the close relationship between the violation of
procedural rules and the government’s ability to use broad substan-
tive laws to obtain convictions for low-level offenses in which police
testimony is particularly critical to establishing guilt, given that
officers are often the primary witnesses. By design, Ferguson’s
police department engaged in rampant Fourth Amendment viola-
tions targeted at black people in the community, such as the use of
“wanteds” and “ped checks.”379 That form of policing provided a
platform for charging defendants with substantive crimes such as
failure to comply.380 Without Fourth Amendment challenges to those
practices, evidentiary problems related to guilt or innocence were
effectively concealed.381 Therefore, deconstitutionalizing criminal
procedural rules would actually remove a key tool from defense
“suspended, discharged, or adjourned” (quoting the National Urban League’s director of
research and publicity, Ira De A. Reid)).
376. See, e.g., id. at 260 (describing Walter Reckless’s 1933 study, Vice in Chicago, showing
that policing of vice targeting black people expanded significantly during the first two decades
of the Great Migration).
377. See Birckhead, supra note 365, at 1623-24 (detailing the state of southern policing at
the start of the twentieth century).
378. See supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text. But see STUNTZ, supra note 315, at 220
(“[M]ore attention paid to enforcing Fourth Amendment doctrine means less attention paid
to other, more important issues, including the defendant’s conduct and intent.”).
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counsel’s ability to litigate guilt or innocence and also eliminate a
means of checking abusive policing practices.
In systems like Ferguson’s, where low-level offenses are punished
primarily through economic sanctions, constitutional procedural
rules are an important tool to ward off the types of abuses seen
there. Substantive rules play a part—they allow defense counsel to
seek the elimination of unconstitutionally vague statutes or reduc-
tions of punishments based on the Excessive Fines Clause—but they
are not enough. Procedural rules ward off the type of policing that
not only allows for easy convictions on low-level offenses in which
guilt or innocence may be obscured by police behavior, but also helps
sustain systems designed for revenue generation. Of course, if there
is hope for either substantive or procedural rules to be used in the
type of constitutional dialogue between the Court and criminal
justice actors envisioned by Sklansky and Weisberg, there must be
an investment in indigent defense representation.
Though what has occurred in Ferguson favors the ability of
counsel to use both substantive and procedural rules to challenge
government action, it does not, of course, resolve the debate, though
it does have implications for the role of criminal procedural rules in
other arenas. First and foremost, it suggests that there should be
expanded consideration of the role of revenue generation in criminal
systems. While this may be most critical when considering systems,
like Ferguson’s, that primarily address low-level offenses through
the imposition of economic sanctions and that are highly dependent
upon such sanctions as revenue-generation tools, the use of econ-
omic sanctions to generate revenue extends into the felony context
and therefore is broadly relevant to criminal justice practices.382 The
experience in Ferguson also suggests the importance of considering
the historical use of selective enforcement for various kinds of
offenses, as well as examination of how procedural rules become
intertwined with determinations of guilt and innocence.
In short, this investigation into how indigent defense counsel may
use criminal procedural rules to ward off the types of abuses seen in
Ferguson provides an opportunity to test and confirm the value of
those rules. It also corroborates the importance of considering
382. See Murch, supra note 372 (highlighting voting disenfranchisement due to criminal
justice debt from felony convictions); supra notes 307-09 and accompanying text.
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revenue generation, historical policing practices, and the use of such
practices in establishing guilt when assessing the role procedural
rules play in checking governmental abuses. But it also confirms the
important work that scholars such as Stuntz, Sklansky, and
Weisberg have undertaken. They have been right to insist that we
look to interactions between constitutional rules and how criminal
law plays out in the real world when searching for the cause of, and
solutions to, seemingly intractable problems including overcrimin-
alization, excessively harsh punishments, and selective enforcement
for which the most politically disenfranchised communities bear the
most significant burden. 
B. Implications for Understanding Access to Counsel as Both
Political and Constitutional
There is an old adage that “prosecutors, when they rise in court,
represent the people of the United States. But so do defense
lawyers—one at a time.”383 That view of the role of indigent defense
is correct. Individual defense representation is the primary means
by which all other rights are afforded a defendant,384 and guards
against a defendant being “put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence.”385 That is the very role indi-
gent defense counsel has played for those lucky few in Ferguson who
have had representation.386 Though correct, however, that view of
indigent defense representation is also incomplete. By shifting the
cost-benefit of crime policies, by forcing the government to take a
position on its policies and practices, and by spotting and making
patterns of abuse public, indigent defense counsel can and are con-
tributing in meaningful ways to political reform of criminal systems.
Understanding the role of defense counsel in this way is useful
for those thinking about how to advocate for reform, whether
through policy advocacy or constitutional reinterpretation. Paul
Butler has written persuasively about how the individualized focus
on the right to counsel may create a distraction from broader
383. Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1114 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
384. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) (describing the right to counsel as
guaranteeing that “all other rights of the accused are protected”).
385. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
386. See, e.g., supra note 265 and accompanying text.
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machinations of criminal systems that create systemic class- and
race-based harm.387 While he has acknowledged that aggressive
litigation of constitutional issues may increase system costs in ways
that create systemic effects,388 he has also posited that advocates
would be better served by “abandon[ing] rights discourse and rather
focus[ing] on reducing the number of poor people overall, and
African Americans specifically, who are incarcerated.”389 What I
raise here are two concerns in the same vein. First, focusing on
counsel as a constitutional right alone obscures the fact that access
to counsel is also a political choice that is part of the broader politi-
cal machination of our criminal systems that allows abuses to occur.
Second, while counsel’s ability to enforce constitutional rights that
protect against government overreach is a key component of its
capacity to effect systemic change, the right to counsel doctrine’s
myopic focus on the rights-enforcing role of counsel has failed to
account for the way in which individual defense representation
functions as a form of political participation by effecting that very
change. These problems are intertwined and together they risk
creating space for the types of abuses seen in Ferguson. 
1. Understanding Access to Counsel as Political
There is evidence that officials in Ferguson see access to counsel
too narrowly, as solely a constitutional right. Despite progress on
other municipal court reforms, at the time this Article went to press,
Ferguson had yet to create a public defender system. The civil rights
class action filed against Ferguson includes a constitutional right to
counsel claim to which Ferguson officials raised no defense,390 but
those officials have behaved as if they are under no obligation to
provide counsel absent a court determination that they are constitu-
tionally mandated to do so. This suggests that Ferguson officials see
the matter as dictated solely by the Constitution in a way that
387. See Butler, supra note 32, at 2195-97; see also Depoorter, supra note 285, at 820
(describing literature that critiques litigation as a form of “legal cooptation of a social
movement”).
388. See Butler, supra note 32, at 2202 (theorizing that increased prosecution costs will
decrease mass incarceration).
389. Id. at 2203.
390. See supra notes 330-31 and accompanying text.
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obscures the role they play in deciding, as a political matter,
whether to provide or deny access to counsel.
Doctrinal limitations on the constitutional right to counsel, of
course, do not prohibit the government from providing counsel.391 It
is lawmakers who choose not to do so. Lawmakers also choose to
grossly underfund counsel, expending only approximately 1 percent
of all criminal justice spending nationally on defense services, with
funding declining even as the number of prosecutions rise.392 Some
lawmakers choose to cut costs on indigent defense by retaining
counsel through low-bid contracts.393 Other lawmakers choose to
fund defense services by charging defendants—who only qualify for
representation if they are indigent—through preservice application
fees or post-conviction assessment of costs.394 Lawmakers even
choose to fund indigent defense through the use of economic sanc-
tions, thereby creating a system in which defense counsel’s financial
viability is dependent upon the court punishing their clients.395
Reimagining the role of counsel not just as a right in and of itself
guarded only by the Constitution, but as an important check upon
government abuses that is also dependent upon the political will of
391. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
392. See Pfaff, supra note 33.
393. See Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Essay, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance
After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2165-67 (2013); Lisa R. Pruitt & Beth A.
Colgan, Justice Deserts: Spatial Inequality and Local Funding of Indigent Defense, 52 ARIZ.
L. REV. 219, 287 (2010).
394. See Beth A. Colgan, Essay, Paying for Gideon, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1929, 1931-32 (2014);
see also BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 167, at 16; Pfaff, supra note 33. In some jurisdic-
tions, application fees for public defense services are waivable. See, e.g., E. Tammy Kim, Poor
Clients Pay Just to Apply for a Public Defender, AL JAZEERA AM. (Jan. 9, 2015, 5:00 AM),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/1/9/poor-defendants-payfeesjusttoapplyfora
publicdefender.html [https://perma.cc/2CG3-SKVX] (describing the application fee increase
in New Jersey from fifty dollars to two hundred dollars, though noting the amount is waiv-
able). Defendants may not be informed that fees are waivable, however, causing them to
forego counsel. See Bright & Sanneh, supra note 393, at 2163-64. In other jurisdictions, appli-
cation fees are required. See, e.g., Ryan Grenoble, Florida Judge Scraps Policy of Arresting
People Who Fail to Pay Court Fines, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 18, 2015, 1:29 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/entry/orange-county-florida-court-fee-arrest_us_55faee45e4b00310edf61
6d1 [https://perma.cc/B4L7-HWK8] (describing a Florida case in which a man waited in jail
for nearly two months without representation because he could not pay a fifty dollar
application fee).
395. See, e.g., Colgan, supra note 394, at 1932; Dylan Walsh, On the Defensive, ATLANTIC
(June 2, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/on-the-defensive/485165/
[https://perma.cc/6SCZ-VEWD].
2017] LESSONS FROM FERGUSON 1247
lawmakers places access to counsel well within the political arena.
The value of work performed by individual defense attorneys in
Ferguson, both for their individual clients and in achieving systemic
reform, shows why it is important to understand the political nature
of access to counsel. If lawmakers are allowed to use the constitu-
tional pedigree of counsel as a shield to deflect responsibility for
denying access to counsel, access will remain limited. If instead,
lawmakers feel political pressure to provide counsel regardless of
whether they are constitutionally mandated to do so, the pattern of
depriving counsel in full, or effectively through deficiency in
funding, could be interrupted. That will not be easy. As several
scholars have noted, political opposition to defense representation,
and in particular to providing sufficient funding to ensure counsel
has the capacity to provide effective representation, is deeply
entrenched in American politics and will be difficult to overcome.396
This may be particularly true in jurisdictions like Ferguson where
access to counsel undermines one of the key reasons the municipal
court system is valued: its capacity to generate revenue.397 Yet there
are reasons to believe that access to defense counsel may be gaining
political traction. In a handful of states, the movement to increase
indigent defense funding has been successful,398 and there is
396. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 32, at 1291 (describing full indigent defense funding as a
“dream” that is “politically and financially unattainable” and calling for a contraction of the
right to counsel to felony cases); see also Carol S. Steiker, Keynote Address, Gideon at Fifty:
A Problem of Political Will, 122 YALE L.J. 2694, 2700 (2013) (explaining that “any
thoroughgoing solution to our Sixth Amendment quandary is less a matter of law than one
of political will” but that “[w]ith clamoring demand for dwindling public funds for schools,
hospitals, roads and bridges, public transportation, firefighters, and police officers, it is not
surprising that more money for lawyers representing alleged criminals is not high on anyone’s
list”). But see Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of
Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 255-68 (2004) (arguing that the odds of legislative
support for parity between prosecution and indigent defenders are high). Constitutional litiga-
tion can aid in forcing legislatures to provide funding for indigent defense. For example, after
years of litigating a class action lawsuit seeking prospective injunctive relief in which plain-
tiffs argued that the State of New York’s failure to fund indigent defense violated the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, the State entered into a settlement in which it agreed, for the
first time, to provide funding to five of its counties. See Stipulation and Order of Settlement
at 3, Hurrell-Harring v. State, No. 8866-07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 21, 2014).
397. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
398. See, e.g., David Carroll, Utah Reforms Indigent Defense with First-Ever State Dollars
for Trial Representation, SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR. (Mar. 16, 2016), http://sixthamendment.org/
utah-reforms-indigent-defense-with-first-ever-state-dollars-for-trial-representation/ [https://
perma.cc/BSW3-5R5D].
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increasing support for indigent defense reform across the political
spectrum.399 Further, though securing legal representation may be
difficult, the same could be said for other seemingly intractable
issues that have seen movement of late, including the push to make
mandatory minimum sentencing part of the reform agenda400 or to
unseat prosecuting attorneys who are seen as too aggressively
punitive.401 The depth with which the indigent defense crisis is
embedded in American criminal justice is exactly why the lessons
of Ferguson, which give fodder to a reimagining of indigent defense
as a fuller check against politics as usual, are so important to
heed.402
399. See, e.g., Andrew Cohen, A New Conservative Approach to Justice: Serve the Poor,
MARSHALL PROJECT (May 12, 2015, 2:13 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/05/12/
a-new-conservative-approach-to-justice-serve-the-poor [https://perma.cc/M8Y8-LQ9K]; Orin
Kerr, Koch Industries Gives Grant to NACDL “to Address the Nation’s Profound Indigent De-
fense Crisis,” WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/10/21/koch-industries-gives-grant-to-nacdl-to-address-
the-nations-profound-indigent-defense-crisis [https://perma.cc/2X9Q-AK4F]. But see Mark
Joseph Stern, Donald Trump Thinks that the Fundamentally American Right to Counsel Is
Hurting America, SLATE (Sept. 19, 2016, 5:51 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/
2016/09/19/donald_trump_on_the_right_to_counsel_for_ahmad_khan_rahami.html [https://
perma.cc/L97X-NXCD] (relating statements by then-presidential candidate Donald Trump
regarding the right to counsel for a bombing suspect).
400. See, e.g., Danyelle Solomon, In a Nutshell: Criminal Justice Bills Pending Before
Congress, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/
nutshell-criminal-justice-bills-pending-congress [https://perma.cc/43LG-C6MN].
401. See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, The Changing Political Landscape for Elected
Prosecutors, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2017); Deborah L. Shelton, Organizers
Celebrate the Defeat of Anita Alvarez by Planning Their Next Steps, NATION (Mar. 16, 2016),
https://www.thenation.com/article/organizers-celebrate-the-defeat-of-anita-alvarez-by-
planning-their-next-steps/ [https://perma.cc/7AHV-GC3N]; see also President Barack Obama,
Remarks at the Democratic National Convention, 2016 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 6 (July 27,
2016) (“If you want more justice in the justice system, then we’ve all got to vote—not just for
a president, but for mayors, and sheriffs, and state’s attorneys, and state legislatures. That’s
where the criminal law is made.”).
402. Cf. Gerald P. López, Keynote Address—Living and Lawyering Rebelliously, 73 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 2041, 2053-54 (2005) (“But how do we know what we can individually and collec-
tively accomplish unless, against the reigning approach to how to live and work, we act as if
our dreams can come true? ... Reject absolutely the ‘common sense’ and ‘mature’ notion that
what we’re now living marks the limits of what’s possible.”).
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2. Accounting for the Political Effect of Individual Defense
Representation Within the Right to Counsel Doctrine
Under both classic and contemporary liberal theory, individual
rights serve to protect against deprivations of personal liberty
through the creation of negative liberties that restrict government
action,403 such as the Fourth Amendment’s limitations on the ability
of police to engage in searches or seizures.404 Though the right to
counsel creates an affirmative obligation on the state rather than a
restriction on its behavior, because the right to counsel is inherently
intertwined with securing protections afforded by negative liber-
ties,405 it fits comfortably within liberal theory.406 Although individ-
ual defense representation certainly fulfills that role, this study of
Ferguson shows it also operates on a separate though related axis
in which the right also functions as a form of civic participation.407
Because individual defense representation can change political
dynamics through the restructuring of the cost-benefit of particular
crime policies and by forcing a public accounting of governmental
behavior, the right to counsel also protects the core democratic value
of participatory government that is traditionally understood as a
tenet of the theory of republican constitutionalism.408 This marriage
of the two theories, in which a right might be understood as both
protective of negative liberties and of the larger democratic project
of participatory government—what Cass Sunstein has dubbed
“[l]iberal republicanism”409—provides an accurate understanding of
the right to counsel. 
403. See, e.g., John Lawrence Hill, A Third Theory of Liberty: The Evolution of Our
Conception of Freedom in American Constitutional Thought, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 115,
124-25, 124 n.37 (2002).
404. See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, Note, To Promote the General Welfare: The Republican
Imperative to Enhance Citizenship Welfare Rights, 111 YALE L.J. 1457, 1465-66 (2002). 
405. See supra notes 383-86 and accompanying text.
406. Cf. Michaels, supra note 404, at 1466-67.
407. See Hill, supra note 403, at 166-67 (“[R]ights have two general functions and should
be understood to operate along both of these axes .... They protect the individual in the pursuit
of a range of personal interests and activities from various forms of social and political
invasion ... [and serve] as empowering devices that permit the individual to invoke various
protections in the name of preserving a counterbalance of social power.”).
408. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1495-96, 1525-26
(1988). 
409. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1541 (1988). 
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The right to counsel doctrine, however, is narrowly focused on the
degree to which counsel is needed to protect negative liberties.410
Take, for example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Scott v. Illinois,
in which the Court declined to recognize the right to counsel in
courts, like Ferguson’s, where people are punished through econom-
ic sanctions.411 Framed as a question of the severity of the depriva-
tion of liberty at stake in the criminal proceeding—where actual
imprisonment is sufficiently severe to warrant the protection of
counsel and economic sanctions are not—the Court could justify the
deprivation of counsel.412 Drawing the line between incarceration
and economic sanctions has proven unworkable and therefore open
to challenge,413 given that jurisdictions like Ferguson are using
incarceration as a collections tool,414 and given that the proliferation
of evidence of the severity of economic sanctions, which can result
in significant and even lifelong consequences for those too poor to
pay.415 But more fundamentally, the Scott decision, like the right to
counsel doctrine as a whole,416 did not grapple with the way in which
counsel serves a means of challenging systems of governance, and
410. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984) (“In a long line of cases
... this Court has recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and is needed,
in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.”); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648, 653-54 (1984) (“[Counsels’] presence is essential because they are the means through
which the other rights of the person on trial are secured.”).
411. See 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).
412. See id. at 371-73.
413. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (“[W]hen governing decisions are
unworkable or are badly reasoned, ‘this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.’”
(quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1994))). For a discussion of how the Supreme
Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), requiring defense counsel to
provide advice on the immigration consequences of a conviction also may require a reevalua-
tion of Scott, see Ingrid V. Eagly, Essay, Gideon’s Migration, 122 YALE L.J. 2282, 2301 (2013).
414. See supra Part I.A.4.
415. See, e.g., Colgan, supra note 133, at 279-81; John D. King, Beyond “Life and Liberty”:
The Evolving Right to Counsel, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 16 (2013) (arguing that the
“actual incarceration” line no longer comports with the realities of misdemeanor punishment,
particularly due to the impact of collateral consequences).
416. See, e.g., Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1114 (2014) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (“In my view, the Court’s opinion pays insufficient respect to the importance of an
independent bar as a check on prosecutorial abuse and government overreaching.”). For a
discussion of how the Sixth Amendment’s ineffectiveness test, set out in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), precludes consideration of systemic issues such as funding,
see, for example, Darryl K. Brown, Epiphenomenal Indigent Defense, 75 MO. L. REV. 907, 925
(2010); and Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming Equality to Reframe Indigent Defense Reform,
97 MINN. L. REV. 1197, 1204-16 (2013). 
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therefore as a form of participatory republicanism that may provide
independent reasons for extending the right.417 While the Scott
Court considered the expense to the state of providing counsel when
holding that fine-only offenses were outside of the scope of the right,
it did not consider how denial of counsel would restrict the ability of
those subjected to criminal systems to engage in political participa-
tion regarding those very systems.418 Counsel provide clients with
the opportunity to engage in civic participation by “function[ing] as
the instrument and defender of the client’s autonomy and dignity in
all phases of the criminal process.”419 By cutting short that opportu-
nity, the right to counsel doctrine denies membership in civic
participation to those who need it most420: criminal defendants who
have “no lobby.”421 The costs of ignoring the political effect of
representation—borne out so starkly in Ferguson—include allowing
systems of governance that favor revenues over fairness and allow
constitutional violations to flourish.422 Individual defense represen-
tation serves as a check against such systemic abuses; that role
should be relevant to constitutional interpretation regarding how
far the constitutional right to counsel should reach.
* * * 
In short, what the continuing lack of a public defense system in
Ferguson’s municipal court suggests is that lawmakers do not yet
feel an obligation to ensure access to effective counsel, regardless of
whether they are mandated to do so by the Constitution. At the
same time, the existing constitutional doctrine has not sufficiently
417. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 371-74 (1979).
418. See id. at 372-73.
419. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 763 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
420. See AMY GUTMANN, LIBERAL EQUALITY 181 (1980) (“To deny effective equal participa-
tory rights or fair equality of participatory opportunities is to deny the equal dignity of
individual citizens.”); Michelman, supra note 408, at 1496 (describing the focus on negative
liberties in the liberal tradition as “abet[ting] the community’s self-betrayal through lapse of
commitment to extension of membership to persons who, at many historical moments, could
not count themselves heirs to traditions whose meanings did at those times involve the exclu-
sion or subordination of just those persons”).
421. Criminal Justice Act: Hearing on H.R. 4816 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 32 (1963) (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of the
United States) (“The poor man charged with crime has no lobby.”).
422. See supra Part I.A.
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accounted for the role indigent defense counsel can play in a partici-
patory government by guarding against systemic abuse. Studying
the way in which indigent defense counsel serve as the primary
enforcement mechanism for constitutional rights, and how enforce-
ment of those rights has the potential to create other criminal jus-
tice reforms, allows a greater understanding of the link between the
two problems. To overcome these problems, those seeking criminal
justice reform should pressure lawmakers to feel an obligation to
support full access to counsel, without a constitutional mandate and
push forward on efforts to create the constitutional mandate that
will force their hand. Both efforts support the same end: ensuring
that indigent defense representation is available to serve as an
important tool of systemic reform.
CONCLUSION
Studying Ferguson shows how affording access to counsel can
increase the enforcement of constitutional rights, and, in doing so,
both raise the operating costs of criminal systems and reduce the
imposition of economic sanctions, depleting the system of its reve-
nue-generating power. The work of pro bono defense counsel in
Ferguson also shows the power of indigent defense representation
to change crime policy debates by forcing the government to stake
out positions in litigation, by spotting patterns of abuse, and by
working to ensure that both are made public. While the confluence
of events in Ferguson and the extent of public scrutiny there were
unique, and while the work of individual defense counsel can be
most effective when undertaken in combination with advocacy by
the Department of Justice, civil rights litigators, and social justice
advocates, the experience in Ferguson shows that traditional indi-
gent defense representation can play a key role in systemic criminal
justice reform.
